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Employment at multinational enterprises (MNEs) responds to wages at the extensive margin, when
an MNE enters a foreign location, and at the intensive margin, when an MNE operates existing affiliates.
We present an MNE model and conditions for parametric and nonparametric identification. Prior studies
rarely found wages to affect MNE employment. We document a complementarity bias when the extensive
margin is excluded and detect salient labor substitution at both margins for German manufacturing
MNEs. With a one-percent increase in home wages, for instance, MNEs add 2,000 jobs in Eastern
Europe at the extensive margin and 4,000 jobs overall; a converse one-percent drop in Eastern European
wages removes 730 German MNE jobs.
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Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are important mediators of world trade.1 Surprisingly, however,
their operation has rarely been found to strongly affect factor demands across locations.2 We study
howMNEsorganizetheirglobalactivityandtheemploymentconsequencesattwocriticalmargins.
An MNE’s labor demand responds to international wage differentials at the extensive margin, when
the MNE enters a foreign market, and at the intensive margin, when the MNE operates existing
afﬁliates.
Our empirical analysis shows that MNEs change their foreign presence only infrequently, but
that these scant changes are associated with salient employment shifts. In most locations, the
extensive-marginresponse topermanent wagedifferentialsisabout as largeas theintensive-margin
adjustment and has considerable consequences for overall factor demand. Using comprehensive
data on German manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates,
we document that not accounting for extensive-margin adjustment biases conventional intensive-
margin estimates predominantly towards complementarity so that common estimates are small or
their signs reversed. An instance of complementarity bias arises if ﬁrms with a high likelihood
to set up shop in low-wage locations also command comparatively low home wages, for example
because their relocation propensity serves as a credible threat in wage bargaining at home.
We present a generic MNE model that encompasses motives for both vertical and horizontal
foreign direct investment (FDI) and derive a simple estimation framework that accounts for the
MNE’s regional conﬁguration at both margins. The model offers an integration of two strands
of the empirical literature—one on MNEs’ location choices and one on MNE operations across
existing locations—into a uniﬁed procedure.3 Our estimators extend the univariate sample selec-
tion case to one of multiple selections and outcomes. With an eye on ease of implementation,
we present conditions under which common Heckman (1979) correction and straightforward non-
parametric estimation (similar to Das, Newey and Vella 2003) can be applied location by location
and integrated into outcome estimation—in our case a seemingly unrelated equation system of
1The world’s ten largest MNEs in 2000 produce almost one percent of world GDP, and the one hundred largest
MNEs are responsible for more than four percent of world GDP (UNCTAD press release TAD/INF/PR/47, 12/08/02).
2See e.g. Slaughter (2000) for U.S. and Konings and Murphy (2006) for European MNEs.
3Among the studies in the former literature are Devereux and Grifﬁth (1998) and Head and Mayer (2004) who
research MNEs’ location choices. Slaughter (2000), Head and Ries (2002) and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter
(2005), for instance, analyze MNE operations across existing locations in the latter literature.
2the MNE’s labor demands.4 Beyond our context, the estimation technique potentially applies to
empirical work on extensive margins in international trade models, such as export-market entry,
import-market access, or intra-ﬁrm trade.
At the extensive margin, several ﬁrm-level studies do not ﬁnd wages or per-capita incomes to
be signiﬁcant predictors of location selection (e.g. Devereux and Grifﬁth (1998) for U.S., Buch,
Kleinert, Lipponer and Toubal (2005) for German MNEs).5 Other studies, using multinomial logit
estimation, recognize wages to predict location choice (e.g. Disdier and Mayer (2004) for French
MNEs, and Becker, Ekholm, J¨ ackle and Muendler (2005) for Swedish MNEs and similar German
MNE data as in this paper). But multinomial logit requires mutually exclusive location choices
so that the simultaneous presence of MNEs in several locations needs to rest on the assumption
of independent decisions, which is not necessarily compatible with MNE-wide proﬁt maximiza-
tion. In contrast, we condition on an MNE’s past presence and its interaction with wages and ﬁnd
wage variables to be statistically signiﬁcant predictors of location choices in several probit and
nonparametric selection regressions, while allowing for correlated decisions. Moreover, our model
suggests that the wage impact on location selection should be weighted with the impact of location
selection on employment to arrive at the wage effect on an MNE’s regional conﬁguration. Doing
so shows that wage differentials across locations are substantial predictors of labor substitution
within MNEs at the extensive margin.
For the intensive margin, Slaughter (2000) reports that operations in low-wage locations have
no detectable impact on relative home employment at U.S. MNEs. Similar to the U.S. evidence,
4For consumer demand, there are three main estimation procedures to account for the extensive margin (non-zero
demand) and the intensive margin (quantity): Amemiya’s (1974) censored system, the primal Kuhn-Tucker approach
of Wales and Woodland (1983), and the dual shadow-price approach of Lee and Pitt (1986). As Haefen, Phaneuf and
Parsons (2004) remark, most empirical models of consumer demand for multiple goods have relied on the discrete-
choice random-utility maximization model (i.e. the extensive margin only). Consumer-demand studies that account
for both interior and corner solutions (intensive and extensive margins) have focused on computationally feasible
estimation techniques that circumvent the curse of dimensionality associated with primal and dual approaches (Mey-
erhoefer, Ranney and Sahn 2005). Estimators on the basis of Amemiya (1974) are common. Yen and Lin (2006)
generalize Heckman (1979) to a maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for censored demand systems under normality.
We present a plausible set of conditions under which an extension of the Heckman two-step estimator is justiﬁed
instead of ML, and cannot reject the conditions in our MNE sample. We also present assumptions that permit a non-
parametric estimator that applies Das et al. (2003) and does not require distributional assumptions while accounting
for heteroskedastic error components. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) conduct selectivity correction in the
context of country-level bilateral trade ﬂows under the assumption of uncorrelated selection choices; they ﬁnd the
selection bias in bilateral trade to be empirically small, in contrast to MNE expansions in the present paper.
5Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) ﬁnd evidence in aggregate data that relatively abundant high-skilled labor is
a signiﬁcant predictor of FDI of U.S. MNEs; and Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003) ﬁnd that larger skill differentials
predict less foreign MNE activity.
3Braconier and Ekholm (2000), Konings and Murphy (2006) and Marin (2004) ﬁnd little or no
evidence that operations of European MNEs in low-wage locations have an impact on home em-
ployment. In contrast to the MNE evidence, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) attribute about a third of
U.S. relative wage changes to cross-border outsourcing at the sector level, within MNEs or across
ﬁrms. For Japanese MNEs, Head and Mayer (2004) report that foreign employment in low-income
countries does relate to more skill-intensive employment at home. Using additional evidence on
U.S. MNEs, Harrison and McMillan (2006) show that foreign employment substitutes for U.S.
MNE employment in industries with no signiﬁcant intra-ﬁrm trade, whereas foreign employment
in low-income countries complements U.S. employment in industries with signiﬁcant intra-ﬁrm
trade, so that the net employment effect is small at the intensive margin.6 When an MNE relocates
a production stage that is complementary at the intensive margin, however, job loss can still result
at the extensive margin.7
We ﬁnd cross-wage elasticities at both margins to be strictly positive. So, home and foreign
employment are substitutes within MNEs not only at the intensive but also at the extensive margin.
Bootstrapped standard errors reject equality between the intensive and the total elasticity of sub-
stitution for most locations, corroborating the importance of the extensive margin. For overseas
developing countries, elasticities are signiﬁcantly different from zero only at the extensive margin.
Elasticity point estimates at both margins are robust across different samples and wage data, model
and correlation speciﬁcations, and parametric and nonparametric estimation techniques.
A third literature on MNEs compares MNE performance to that of other MNEs or national
ﬁrms with no foreign afﬁliates. Studies typically detect no clear difference between MNEs and
non-MNEs at the ﬁrm level (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003, Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2008,
J¨ ackle and Wamser forthcoming), with few exceptions (Debaere, Lee and Lee 2006). Using for-
eign growth rates as instruments for FDI, Desai, Foley and Hines (2009) ﬁnd that foreign and
domestic investment expenditures and wage bills are positively associated within MNEs. At the
worker level, Becker and Muendler (2008) document more worker retentions at expanding MNEs
than at non-expanding MNEs. But those studies do not discern whether foreign MNE expan-
6Riker and Brainard (1997) report too that afﬁliate activities in low-income countries are complementary to activ-
ities in high-income countries. Hanson et al. (2005) shift focus from factor demands to intermediate input uses and
report that afﬁliates of U.S. MNEs process signiﬁcantly more intra-ﬁrm imports the lower are low-skilled wages.
7Consistentwiththisidea, weﬁndthedeveloping-countrywageelasticityofhomeemploymentnottobesigniﬁcant
at the intensive margin but signiﬁcantly positive at the extensive margin.
4sions stabilize industry activity at home or whether market-share gains by MNEs result in market-
share losses at domestic competitors. In the interest of concision, we bridge the two literatures
on location-selection and employment substitution but do not attempt to integrate the third litera-
ture on reallocations between MNEs and non-MNEs. Concretely, we condition on product-market
shares as is required for labor-demand estimation within MNEs.
We evaluate the counterfactual question as to how many jobs MNEs would reallocate in re-
sponsetoshrinkingwagedifferentials. Aone-percentdropinGermanwagesrelativetothesample-
mean level would reduce MNE employment in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by around 4,000
jobs overall, for instance. Similarly, a one-percent increase in CEE wages would bring 730 jobs
to Germany. These are sizeable ﬁgures. Wages in CEE are, on average, about 10 percent of the
German level in 2000. If the estimated elasticities of substitution were constant at all wage levels,
an increase in CEE wages by 450% to cut the wage gap to Germany in half would bring 330,000
(= 730 ¢ 450) counterfactual manufacturing jobs to Germany—about a quarter of the estimated
home employment at German manufacturing MNEs.8 Of course, elasticities of substitution are not
constant at all wage levels so that the counterfactual prediction is crude. We nevertheless view the
magnitude as indicative of the potential importance of multinational labor substitution.
This paper has four more sections. In Section 2, we present a model of the expansion and
operation of MNEs and report identiﬁcation conditions for estimation under location selectivity
(derivations in the Appendix). Section 3 discusses the data and descriptive statistics on location
choice (details in the Appendix). Estimation results on multinational labor substitution are pre-
sented in Section 4, and interpreted in counterfactual evaluations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Multinational Expansion and Operation
2.1 Labor demand and location selectivity
There are L locations for production and sales. In period t, MNE j employs yjt workers at up to
L locations and produces up to L location-speciﬁc outputs qjt with quasi-ﬁxed capital kjt under
variable-input prices wt (these variables are L-dimensional vectors). Production technology is
8If international wage gaps shrink at a similar rate as per capita GDP converges to steady state and Germany is
close to its steady state, the CEE-German wage gap would take around 35 years to contract to half its present size
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992).
5the same for all MNEs. The factor prices wt are market-wide outside prices by location. We
specify the short-run cost function C(qjt;kjt;wt) to be a multiproduct translog cost function.
The translog form is ﬂexible. Its cross-wage elasticities of substitution offer a compact way to
summarize multinational labor substitutability or complementarity.9
An MNE’s wage bill shares are s`
jt ´ w`
ty`
jt=Cjt at locations ` = 1;:::;L. Under a translog
short-run cost function, we can transform the L equations of wage-bill shares into L labor demand
functions by multiplying the dependent variable and all regressors with the observation-speciﬁc
scalars Cjt=w`
















































by Shepard’s lemma (see Appendix A).10
Not all ﬁrms are producing in all locations. The employment effect of MNE selection into
locations is both of economic interest in itself and of empirical concern for estimating (1). Con-
sider, for instance, the effect of home wages (n = HOM) on employment in Central and Eastern
Europe (` = CEE). In the absence of any selectivity treatment, the CEE wage-bill response to log
home wages is measured by ±`n, and a positive ±`n implies substitutability between home and CEE
employment; a negative ±`n is necessary for complementarity. Suppose German ﬁrms that face
high wages under an industry-speciﬁc collective agreement also have a high likelihood to set up
shop in CEE countries. For such ﬁrms, the uncorrected estimate of the CEE wage-bill response
to home wages is positively biased so that the estimated cross-wage elasticity will be biased to-
wards substitutability between home and CEE countries, unless selectivity is controlled for. Such a
9We adopt the Brown and Christensen (1981, eq. 10.21) short-run version of the Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau
(1973) translog cost function and extend the speciﬁcation to multiple products (Appendix A). A main alternative
would be Hall’s (1973) generalization of the Diewert (1971) Leontief cost function to the multiproduct case. We favor
the translog cost function because it is parsimonious. We choose a short-run function because our location-selectivity
estimation captures long-term installation costs and because observed capital inputs are arguably closer proxies to
MNE-speciﬁc user costs of capital than price measures. We use time subscripts to clarify that our empirical approach
compares ﬁrm j’s current presence to its own past presence, requiring panel data.
10The transformed labor-demand equations have three advantages over conventional wage-bill share equations.
First, labor demand is not bounded above so that, conditional on x`
jt, the labor demand disturbance satisﬁes the
assumption of one-sided censoring for selectivity correction. Second, wages become regressors only and do not enter
the dependent variable. Third, there is no constant term among the regressors x`
jt so that lacking identiﬁcation of the
constant in a nonparametric selection correction is no concern.
6substitutability bias is particularly plausible if institutional uncertainty in the host location, and an
industry’s low relocation propensity in the past, make relocation a weak threat with little credibility
in wage bargaining at home. For other foreign locations, the threat may be more credible. Suppose
that ﬁrms with a high likelihood to set up shop in neighboring WEU countries, where real wages
are below German levels between 1996 and 2001, command comparatively low home wages be-
cause their relocation propensity serves as a credible threat in wage bargaining at home. For such
ﬁrms, the uncorrected estimate of the WEU wage-bill response to home wages is negatively biased
so that the estimated cross-wage elasticity is biased towards complementarity between home and
WEU countries, unless selectivity is controlled for. Previous empirical research largely ignored
the selection issue in estimating multinational labor demand.
More formally, an MNE’s choice of foreign activity is a two-stage decision problem. At time
t ¡ ¿, that is ¿ periods prior to production and sales, the MNE selects the locations for its foreign
afﬁliatesandcapitalinputskjt aroundtheworld. TheMNEfacesuncertaintyandbasesthelocation
and capital-input decisions on the vector of selection predictors zj;t¡¿ (competitors’ future outputs
qi6=j;t, own realized output qjt and input prices wt are uncertain). On the second stage at time t,
MNE j simultaneously chooses output qjt and variable factor inputs. So, conditional on presence
d`




















by (1), where djt is a vector of MNE j’s multinational presence at locations n = 1;:::;L and







for MNE j to be present at locations
n = 1;:::;L. The empirical concern is that eq. (2) violates mean independence of the disturbance




jt = 1; zj;t¡¿
¤
6= 0.
In economic terms, permanent wage differentials between locations ` and n have an impact on





jt include the translog-transformed spot wages wn
t ).
We call this the intensive-margin response because the spot wage affects employment outcomes
conditional on the MNE’s presence throughout the world. At the extensive margin, past wages
affect a ﬁrm’s propensity Pr
n
jt to enter n, and in turn presence at n affects current employment at
` through m`(¢) (selection predictors zj;t¡¿ contain past wages wn
t¡¿). Note that, in our context
of cross-location employment responses, the extensive margin cannot be represented with just a
7count of afﬁliates or employments because the opening of afﬁliates has an unobserved effect on
MNE employment elsewhere.






























Estimators for one margin at a time can fail to detect the correct magnitude of employment
responses to international wage differences for at least two reasons. First, eq. (2) shows that ¯`
coefﬁcients at the intensive margin may be biased unless the unobserved error component m`(¢)
is controlled for. A preview of results in our data documents bias (Table F.1 in the Appendix).
Uncorrected cross-wage elasticities are mostly distorted towards complementarity (negative rela-
tive differences in the table) and even turn from indicating substitutability to complementarity in
several cases (relative differences of less than negative one in the table). But the distortion is not
uniform across foreign locations. The home-employment elasticity with respect to foreign wages,
for instance, is under-estimated with a complementarity bias of up to 26 percent for DEV wage
changes and over-estimated with a substitutability bias of up to .6 percent for CEE wage changes
in data on manufacturing afﬁliates.
Second, eq. (3) shows that estimates of propensity changes in response to wage levels measure
only a part of the extensive margin’s importance for employment outcomes. Similar to earlier










jt, wage changes at the extensive margin are found to have an economically
and statistically highly signiﬁcant impact that is about as large as intensive-margin adjustment.
2.2 Elasticities
Cost-function estimates themselves are hard to interpret. We therefore report results in terms of
cross-wage elasticities of substitution. These elasticities quantify the response of labor demand in
one location to permanent wage changes at the same location or elsewhere. Our model of the MNE
8allows us to derive the constant-output cross-wage elasticity of substitution between factors ` and
n.11 The cross-wage elasticity of substitution is deﬁned as "`n ´ @ lny`





jt=@ lnwn + s`sn




jt=@ lnw` + s`(s` ¡ 1)
s` (4)
for a short-run translog cost function, where s` = w`y`=Cjt is the wage bill share of the workforce
at ` (the wage bill at location ` in the MNE’s total wage bill). By (2), the marginal response of the
wage bill share s`
jt to a permanent change in lnwn is
@s`
jt



























The ﬁrst term in (5) captures the labor demand response at the intensive margin, where ±`n is the
regression coefﬁcient on the transformed wage in eq. (1). The second term in (5) is a measure of
the labor demand response to a permanent wage change at the extensive margin. The extensive-
margin estimate is multiplied by the spot wage wn
t because estimation on the ﬁrst stage uses wn
t
as regressors, not their logs. Division by Cjt=w`
t converts the extensive-margin estimate from the
transformed labor demand eq. (1) back into the wage bill share equivalents.
We presented the derivation of cross-wage elasticities in the benchmark context of competitive
labor markets. MNEs, however, are known to pay wage premia over local competitors. Suggested
reasons include relatively skilled workforces and theories of rent sharing through efﬁciency wages
or bargaining. Our derived cross-wage elasticities are consistent with departures from competitive
labor markets under wage bargaining. Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b), for instance, consider
bargaining between a ﬁrm and its individual workers, whose contracts cannot bind them to the
ﬁrm. Their model relates bargaining outcomes to a ﬁrm’s individual proﬁtability and can explain
within-industry wage differences between ﬁrms, such as mark-ups at MNEs relative to local com-
petitors, if there are ﬁxed hiring costs at wage-bargaining ﬁrms. A wage-bargaining ﬁrm’s cost
function does not necessarily exhibit ﬁrst-degree homogeneity in paid wages. But, in line with
our translog cost speciﬁcation where we use location-wide median wages as outside wages, the
wage-bargaining ﬁrm’s cost function is homogeneous of degree one in reservation wages.12
11The cross-wage elasticity provides the same information to determine complementarity and substitutability as the
Allen-Uzawa elasticity, which scales the cross-wage elasticity by a cost share. The Morishima elasticity measures
curvature but is less informative regarding complementarity.
12The ﬁrst-order condition in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) for single-product ﬁrms requires that, at the optimal
9The consequences of wage bargaining for labor demand are theoretically ambiguous when
contracts are non-binding. A wage-bargaining ﬁrm in the original Stole and Zwiebel framework
over-employs workers, compared to a neoclassical ﬁrm, because additional workers depress other
workers’ wages by reducing the impact of threats to quit. In a dynamic extension to optimal
employment choice over time (Wolinsky 2000), employment at wage-bargaining ﬁrms is nearly
efﬁcient in the proﬁt maximizing equilibrium. If there is an outside pool of ready-to-be-employed
workers, then a wage-bargaining ﬁrm under-employs workers in static optimum because replace-
ment workers can be hired instantaneously, lessening the impact of other workers’ threats to quit
(de Fontenay and Gans 2003). To capture potential employment distortions, whatever their direc-
tion, we conduct robustness checks of the competitive labor-market benchmark and augment labor
demand equations with industry- and location-speciﬁc log wage premia at MNEs.
The cross-wage elasticities are constant-output elasticities and reﬂect the curvature of the ﬁrm’s
multinational production technology. For the estimation of (2), we therefore condition on the vec-
tor of location-speciﬁc outputs. In product-market equilibrium, of course, an MNE’s market share
is endogenous to its cost or sales advantages after FDI. This suggests an extended approach with
endogenous output for future research. A structural approach to market-share reallocations after
FDI, however, requires assumptions on product-market competition. In contrast, cost function es-
timation as in (2) is consistent with alternative forms of product-market competition and elucidates
employment reallocations within MNEs under lean assumptions. Naturally, the within-MNE em-
ployment reallocations documented in this paper are a key part of the labor-market response to FDI
also in general equilibrium.
employment level ~ n, realized proﬁts are equal to average proﬁts over all putative inframarginal workforce sizes
¼(n;k) = pq(n;k) ¡ wn ¡ rk = (1=~ n)
R ~ n
0 ¼(s;k)ds ´ ~ ¼(~ n;k);
wherew andr arereservationfactorprices. Sinceoptimalproﬁts¼(~ n;k)arehomogeneousofdegreeoneinreservation
prices by this ﬁrst-order condition (an instance of the envelope theorem), the cost function is homogeneous of degree
one in reservation wages. Similarly, Shepard’s lemma holds for the reservation wage.
102.3 Modelling selectivity
A proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm is present at location ` iff the expected proﬁt difference between presence


























j;t¡¿ is the sunk cost of producing at `, and ´`
j;t¡¿ is an MNE’s speciﬁc disturbance to sunk
costs. The expected net proﬁt of presence H(zj;t¡¿) is equal to the sum of expected revenues p`q
`;¤
jt
from producing at ` and the expected cost savings C(q`
jt=0;¢)¡C(q
`;¤
jt ;¢) from presence at `, less
the sunk cost.13
Under a parametric speciﬁcation of the disturbance, we can estimate the sunk costs of entry and
exit in probability terms. Given ﬁxed entry costs °`
N and ﬁxed exit costs °`
X, the costs of changing







































N) is also called the hysteresis band. It reﬂects the sunk costs that induce ﬁrms with
a presence to continue operations at location ` (Dixit 1989).
Our empirical MNE model has L ¡ 1 location-selection equations (6) because presence at
home cannot be estimated in a data set for a single country’s MNEs. The model has L¡1 outcome
equations (2) because the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in wages and hence one
labor-demand equation becomes redundant (we omit the home labor-demand equation). Denoting
13Rearrangement of H(zj;t¡¿) ´ Ej;t¡¿[¦(q
`;¤












jt ] + Ej;t¡¿[C(q`
jt=0;¢) ¡ C(q
`;¤








jt ;¢). This general selection condition encompasses motives for both horizontal and
vertical FDI, which may overlap in practice (Feinberg and Keane 2006).



















by (6) and (2). Different functional forms can be speciﬁed for H(zj;t¡¿), and alternative distri-
butional assumptions can be placed on ´`
j;t¡¿ and ²`
jt. We consider two sets of assumptions: (1)
a parametric version with linear H(¢) and joint normality of ´`
j;t¡¿ and ²`
jt; (2) a nonparametric
version for some smooth function H(¢) with independent ´n
j;t¡¿ and ²`
jt for n 6= `.
Assumption 1: Parametric location selection. Assumption (1) is an extension of the familiar
Heckman (1979) selection model to multiple equations (locations). The correlation between ²n
jt,
the idiosyncratic component of labor demand, and ´`
j;t¡¿, the unobserved labor-demand effect of
location selectivity, across locations n 6= ` is crucial for estimation of outcomes (1). Our data reject
independence of ²n
jt and ´`
j;t¡¿.14 To specify a correlation structure consistent with these ﬁndings,
we depart from the idea that selection disturbances include both location-speciﬁc parts such as, for
example, surprising changes to proﬁt repatriation policies in the host country and include MNE-
speciﬁc parts such as idiosyncratic shocks to a ﬁrm’s sunk entry costs. Changes to host-country
repatriation policies affect the entry decision. But once the MNE operates in the host country, it
minimizes costs irrespective of entry-related host-country shocks. So, we consider it plausible to
assume that there is an MNE-speciﬁc, location-independent component ejt to the selection shock
´n
j;t¡¿ and that the labor-demand shock ²`
jt correlates with the selection shock ´n
j;t¡¿ elsewhere only
through the MNE-speciﬁc component ejt. The assumption is not rejected in our data. Note that,
under this assumption, cost function disturbances do covary with entry shocks across locations, but
only through an MNE-speciﬁc component.
Lemma 1 in Appendix C shows that under this assumption, location-by-location correction
for selectivity is permissible. Intuitively, all selection-related information that is relevant for la-
bor demand at any location ` is fully contained in the single presence indicator d`
jt, which is as
informative about ´`
j;t¡¿ as any other location indicator.
14SUR estimation of the outcome equations shows that ²n
jt and ²`
jt correlate so that ²n
jt and ´`




12Assumption 2: Nonparametric location selection. Under nonparametric selectivity correction,
no functional-form assumption needs to be placed on the distributions of ´`
j;t¡¿ or ²jt, and H(¢)
can be any smooth function. We consider a nonparametric multiple-outcome model with multiple
thresholds. We present assumptions that guarantee identiﬁcation similar to a single-outcome model
with multiple thresholds in Das et al. (2003). A set of sufﬁcient identifying assumptions is stated
in Appendix D, where we also provide a proof (Lemma 2) that applies a related result from Das et
al. (2003).
We base identiﬁcation on four sufﬁcient conditions. First, the conditional expectation of the
labor demand disturbance ´`
j;t¡¿ is a differentiable function of propensity scores. Second, at least
one predictor of the propensity score is not also a predictor of the labor-demand outcome. Third,
the regressors in the information set at t ¡ ¿ predict the propensity score. Note that these three
conditions allow us to relax the earlier identifying assumption that (²n
jt;´`
j;t¡¿) is independent of xm
jt
and zj;t¡¿ for all `;m;n. Compared to Assumption 1, these three assumptions only require that,
conditional on the propensity score Pr
`
jt, ²`
jt is uncorrelated with all functions of x`
jt and zj;t¡¿.
Fourth, we impose cross-equation independence on the labor demand disturbance ´`
j;t¡¿ (so that
we do not need to condition on observed d
k6=`
jt elsewhere). The nonparametric estimator allows for
conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form (and thus presents a nonparametric alternative to
Chen and Khan’s (2003) three-step estimator). This makes nonparametric analysis a powerful tool
for multivariate binary selection estimation.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our principal data source is a conﬁdential three-dimensional panel data set of German MNEs
(parent-afﬁliate-year observations), collected by Deutsche Bundesbank (BuBa). Individually iden-
tiﬁed outward FDI data are available since 1996, include all directly and indirectly owned foreign
afﬁliates above reporting thresholds, and provide two-digit NACE 1.1 sector classiﬁcations for the
parent and afﬁliates. Our estimation sample ends in 2001.
We retain only majority-owned afﬁliates because a multi-location cost function suggests that
parent ﬁrms have full managerial control.15 We restrict the sample to manufacturing parents and
15Majority ownership has the additional advantage to be insensitive to a change in the reporting threshold in MIDI
1999. German parent ﬁrms may in turn be ultimately owned by foreign MNEs; between 1996 and 2001 13.1 percent
13their manufacturing afﬁliates. MNEs that span fewer industries appear more likely to satisfy the
assumption of full managerial control, and cross-country wage data are most comprehensive and
reliable for the manufacturing sector. Results for majority-owned afﬁliates from any sector (and
their manufacturing parents) are nevertheless broadly similar.16
We transform the data to parent-location-year observations, deﬂate them with location-speciﬁc
CPIs, convert foreign-currency values to their EUR equivalents in December 1998 (the sample mid
point) to remove nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations, and combine the data with complementary
information on wages and host-country characteristics from various sources. Details on currency
conversion and the complementary host-country data are in Appendix E.
3.1 MNE data
For foreign afﬁliates, we obtain employment, turnover and ﬁxed assets from BuBa’s MIDI database
(MIcro database Direct Investment, formerly DIREK). MIDI covers the universe of majority-owned
foreign afﬁliates and offers their balance sheet information, including in years with zero turnover.
MIDI is based on outward FDI information from a legally mandated annual survey that covers
the universe of German parent ﬁrms with foreign corporate holdings above minimum ownership
shares and capital stock thresholds (Lipponer 2003). We use ﬁxed assets from the balance sheet as
our measure of the capital stock, thus excluding non-physical capital to avert valuation differences
across ﬁrms. Turnover is not corrected for within-MNE shipments, but is a proxy nevertheless to
afﬁliate production for cost-function estimation.
ForGermanparentﬁrms, employment, turnoverandﬁxed-assetinformationcomesfromBuBa’s
conﬁdential USTAN database (Deutsche Bundesbank 1998), which records balance sheets and in-
come statements of ﬁrms that draw a bill of exchange. The bill of exchange is a common form of
payment among ﬁrms of all sizes throughout the sample period 1996-2001 (though losing popu-
of the German MNEs in our sample are afﬁliates of foreign MNEs.
16Employmentatnon-manufacturingafﬁliatesabroadisimportant. Majority-ownedretailandwholesaleafﬁliatesof
manufacturing parents, for instance, account for about as much employment abroad as majority-owned manufacturing
afﬁliates worldwide (but in CEE for just about half as much employment as manufacturing afﬁliates). In a sample
with majority-owned afﬁliates from any sector (and their manufacturing parents), labor substitution at both margins is
even more pronounced than in our manufacturing-afﬁliate sample, while the intensive margin becomes relatively more
important perhaps because of lower sunk entry and exit costs outside manufacturing. Absent selectivity correction,
distortions into complementarity are more prevalent in the sample with afﬁliates from any sector (lower panel of
Table F.1 in the Appendix).
14larity thereafter). USTAN is considered the most comprehensive source of balance sheet data for
companies of all sizes outside the ﬁnancial sector in Germany. We link MIDI and USTAN data by
parent name and address, resulting in the loss of some observations from the universe.17 From
USTAN, we retain non-MNEs (national ﬁrms) that are to become MNEs during the sample period
or were MNEs earlier in the sample period.
To reduce dimensionality, we lump host countries into four aggregate locations: CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), and
WEU (Western Europe), beyond the home location Germany (see Table F.2 for deﬁnitions). Ag-
gregation into four foreign locations and home limits the estimated cross-wage elasticity matrix to
ﬁve columns and rows (with 25 elasticity estimates). We choose the aggregate locations to share
geographic characteristics, and to broadly contain countries with relatively similarly skilled labor
forces or related institutional characteristics. CEE and WEU share borders with Germany and
are geographically contiguous, whereas OIN includes non-European industrialized countries, and
DEV spans the remaining developing countries throughout Africa, Latin America and the Asia-
Paciﬁc region. The aggregate locations nevertheless conceal considerable heterogeneity so that for
robustness estimation we also group countries into four manufacturing-wage quartiles.
As Table 1 shows, the four aggregate locations host similarly large manufacturing workforces
for German manufacturing MNEs: between 250,000 and 400,000 employees. Among the low-
wage locations we focus on CEE where most expansions happen. For the 2,247 MIDI MNEs with
foreign presence either in 1996 or 2000, CEE was the region where MNEs opened most new af-
ﬁliates, operating 18.2 percent more afﬁliates in 2000 than in 1996, followed by DEV with a 12.6
percent increase, OIN with 3.2 percent and WEU with 2.0 percent. We estimate that German
manufacturing MNEs with majority-owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates employ about 1.4 mil-
lion German workers in 2000, including their predicted out-of-sample employment.18 The largest
employment per MNE occurs in OIN and the smallest employment in WEU.
Table 1 also presents a comparison of German MNE employment ﬁgures to ILO employment
17Our conservative string matching routine ﬁlters out potential duplicates from time-varying ﬁrm identiﬁers in
USTAN. In manual treatments, only doubtlessly identiﬁable parent pairs from MIDI and USTAN are kept. At the
expense of reduced sample size, this caution guarantees the formation of time-consistent parent pairs.
18MIDI and USTAN matches are incomplete so that we do not observe parent employment for every German MNE.
We predict total parent employment for the full sample of German manufacturing MNEs from a linear regression of
parent employment on foreign employments.
15Table 1: MNES AND LABOR MARKETS
HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MNE employment 1,423,086a 245,721 332,622 319,221 394,579
Estimation sample MNE employment 962,726 125,199 184,560 139,240 191,854
Mean employment per sample MNE 1,629.0 387.6 407.4 736.7 282.6
Individual afﬁliates’ employment share .0003 .0002 .00007 .0002
All German MNEs’ total employment share .175a .014 .002 .006 .021
MNE log wage premia over local competitorsb .626 .861 .072 .283
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 2000 (1996 to 2001 for prediction), German manufacturing MNEs and their majority-
owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates; ILO paid manufacturing employment by country in 2000; UNIDO manufac-
turing wages 1998 and IUI 1998 paid wages at majority-owned manufacturing afﬁliates of Swedish manufacturing
MNEs.
Notes: Employment shares are location-wide averages over country-mean shares for afﬁliates of German MNEs in
ILO totals. Wage premia are logs of the ratios of paid wages at Swedish MNEs over UNIDO manufacturing wages.
Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Indus-
trialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
aPredicted German employment at in- and out-of-sample MNEs, based on linear employment regressions to ac-
count for incomplete MIDI-USTAN matches.
bSwedish MNE log wage premia. German and Swedish MNEs exhibit similar labor-demand behavior (Becker et
al. 2005).
totals. Although German manufacturing MNEs employ an estimated 17.5 percent of German man-
ufacturing workers, the MNEs’ labor-market power is arguably limited. In Germany, collective
agreements with strong industry-wide unions do not allow individual ﬁrms to deviate from wage
schedules that specify wages by worker skill and seniority (only distressed ﬁrms qualify for ex-
ception clauses). German MNE afﬁliates have plausibly small market power abroad. Individual
foreign afﬁliates of German MNEs command an average market share of just between .7 percent of
a percent (.00007 in OIN) and 3 percent of a percent (.0003 in CEE) across the four foreign regions;
even the total of all German MNEs merely commands an average market share by foreign country
of between .2 percent (DEV) and 2.1 percent (WEU). Wage premia also suggest that MNEs do
not exert monopsony power. Canonical monopsony models predict wage mark-downs. In contrast,
MNEs pay wage premia (Swedish MNEs pay between 7.2 percent (OIN) and 86.1 percent (DEV)
over their local competitors). However, to control for potential labor-demand distortions from
MNE rent sharing, we will account for MNE wage premia by host country and industry below.
The data exhibit strikingly rare changes to foreign presence, consistent with considerable sunk
costs of entry and exit. Table 2 shows changes to foreign presence between 1996 and 2000. Large-
16Table 2: LOCATION COUNTS BY MNE
L in 2000 Total
L in 1996 1 2 3 4 5 (100%)
1 0.0% 83.5% 12.2% 2.6% 1.6% 794
2 83.7% 12.5% 3.2% 0.6% 687
34.7% 54.7% 8.2% 2.1% 0.4% 1,052
3 23.7% 55.8% 15.8% 4.7% 190
28.0% 17.1% 40.2% 11.4% 3.4% 264
4 11.1% 25.0% 45.8% 18.1% 72
24.2% 8.4% 19.0% 34.7% 13.7% 95
5 7.4% 3.7% 22.2% 66.7% 27
35.7% 4.8% 2.4% 14.3% 42.9% 42
Total 630 211 91 44 976
477 1,293 308 112 57 2,247
Source: MIDI universe1996and2000(notmatchedto USTAN), manufacturingMNEsandtheirmajority-ownedforeign
manufacturing afﬁliates.
Notes: MNEs with foreign presence in 1996 and 2000 (large entries), and MNEs with foreign presence in one or both
years (small entries). Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries),
OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
font entries are for ﬁrms that are MNEs in both years, italicized small-font entries include ﬁrms
that become or cease to be MNEs. Out of ﬁve MNEs with two locations (home and one foreign
location) in 1996 more than four keep exactly two locations (large-font entries in row 2). A similar
pattern holds for any multiple-location MNE: entries along the diagonal exhibit the highest fre-
quency in every row and every column. Regional expansions are gradual: the frequencies above
the diagonal decrease monotonically in every row. Regional exits, however, are generally not grad-
ual: MNEs that exit most frequently abandon all foreign locations at once; frequencies in the ﬁrst
column dominate frequencies below the diagonal in the third and ﬁfth row (small-font entries in
column 1). There is a remarkable number of complete withdrawals between 1996 and 2000 (477
out of 2,247 MNEs), but most of those withdrawers were present in only one foreign location in
1996 (365 out of 477). Note that the MIDI data cover the universe of German ﬁrms with FDI above
minimum thresholds, and sample attrition is mitigated by the legal obligation to report and BuBa’s
commitment to follow up on missing questionnaires.
At the extensive margin, we query the number of afﬁliates and countries that are involved in
17Table 3: MNE COUNTS OF CHANGING AFFILIATE NUMBERS
CEE DEV OIN WEU MNE Total
N2000 ¡ N1996 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
· ¡3 2 3 2 15 22
¡2 3 11 3 14 31
¡1 6 17 11 64 98
0 186 131 145 397 859
+1 25 32 20 72 149
+2 11 11 4 16 42
+3 2 6 4 10 22
¸ +4 7 11 4 14 36
MNE Total 242 222 193 602 1,259
¹ N2000 1.49 2.38 1.56 1.96
¹ N1996 1.41 2.28 1.50 2.01
Sources: MIDI universe 1996 and 2000 (not matched to USTAN). MNEs with regional presence of at least one afﬁliate
in 1996; manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates.
Notes: Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas
Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe). Median number of afﬁliates by MNE, location and year: 1.
changes to foreign presence. German MNEs typically pursue a single-afﬁliate strategy of foreign
presence: the median number of afﬁliates per aggregate location is one. Table 3 shows that, once
an MNE has established its presence in a given location with at least one afﬁliate, the number of
afﬁliates hardly changes: 859 out of 1,259 MNE observations in given locations exhibit no change
to the number of afﬁliates between 1996 and 2000; 247 out of 1,259 MNEs increase or decrease
the number of afﬁliates by one. A small remainder of 153 parents chooses to change the number of
afﬁliates by more. (The MNE total in Table 3 is smaller than that in Table 2 because we condition
on presence in a location.) Changes to the number of host countries within locations are even less
frequent than changes to the number of afﬁliates: an analysis of host country changes similar to
Table 3 shows that 947 out of 1,259 observations of MNEs exhibit no change in the number of
selected host countries within the aggregate location.19 Motivated by these ﬁndings, we deﬁne the
19Infrequent net changes to the number of afﬁliates and countries could, in principle, conceal gross alternations
such as changes to the country composition within a location or exit and reentry with a different afﬁliate. The data
show that only small shares of MNEs that maintain a constant number of afﬁliates within a location change countries.
In both CEE and WEU 4.2 percent of MNEs with constant afﬁliate numbers between 1996 and 2000 change host
country, and 7.2 percent of the MNEs with constant afﬁliate numbers in DEV change country, but none do so in OIN.
Similarly small fractions are associated with changing afﬁliate IDs, suggesting that the few gross alternations beyond
18extensive margin as location selection in its most basic sense: an MNE’s entry into an aggregate
location with the ﬁrst worker at its ﬁrst afﬁliate.
3.2 Wage data
Paid wages are not reported in MIDI. We use manufacturing wages by country and sector for 1996
through 2001 from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database at the 3-digit ISIC level (dividing
sectoral wage bills by employment) for our main analysis. We also report robustness checks using
OWW wage data by occupation (Occupational Wages around the World, Freeman and Oostendorp
2001).20 Appendix E.2 provides details on the wage data sources. Though USTAN has German
parent wages, for comparability we take German wages from the same outside sources as afﬁliate
wages.
We construct different wage regressors for the two margins to address econometric concerns.
For intensive-margin labor-demand estimation on the second stage, we use median wages over
sectors by country. The median mitigates possible sectoral workforce composition effects behind
local wages. Concretely, we take the arithmetic mean over the sector-median wages across the
foreign countries where the MNE is present in a given year, and we take Germany-wide sector
medians of the home wages by year. These wages are the decision-relevant local labor costs that
the MNE faces at the intensive margin. To account for typical MNE wage premia on top of local
labor costs, we obtain Swedish afﬁliate wages by host country and sector from the IUI (Research
Institute of Industrial Economics) data base for 1998 (Ekholm and Hesselman 2000), divide the
MNE wages by the UNIDO manufacturing wages for host country and sector in 1998, and use the
log ratios as controls for wage premia in robustness checks. German and Swedish MNEs exhibit
similar labor-demand behavior abroad (Becker et al. 2005).
For extensive-margin estimation on the ﬁrst stage, wage variables must not depend on an
MNE’s country selection. Moreover, foreign wages are location-speciﬁc attributes and would
therefore not be identiﬁed for the cross-section of MNEs in binomial choice models. To rely less
on time variation, we make our foreign-wage variables (sector-median wages by country) MNE-
speciﬁc. We take competitor averages for every MNE over the foreign wages that the MNE’s Ger-
net changes are mostly country changes and not reentries with different afﬁliates.
20We report additional robustness checks with UBS wage data in the working paper version. Results vary little with
different wage data.
19Table 4: SAMPLE MEANS OF VARIABLES
HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU
(t: 1998-2001, t ¡ ¿: 1996-99) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indic.: Presence in t 1 .379 .323 .299 .702
Indic.: Presence in t ¡ ¿ 1 .351 .296 .281 .706
MNE-wide regressors (Labor-demand estimation)
Wage bill share (t) .791 .067 .049 .170 .191
ln Turnover (t) 18.450 15.931 16.505 17.277 17.073
ln Fixed assets (t) 17.264 14.886 15.108 15.804 15.282
ln Wage (t) 10.360 8.286 8.657 10.316 10.098
Competitor-average regressors (Selection estimation)
ln sample-mean Wage (t ¡ ¿) 10.428 8.278 8.708 10.348 10.076
Comp.s’ hosts ln Market access (t ¡ ¿) 11.234 10.525 12.637 12.826 11.552
Comp.s’ hosts skill share < Home (t ¡ ¿) 20.151 18.958 22.358 22.565 20.715
Comp.s’ hosts skill share ¸ Home (t ¡ ¿) 42.100 39.052 48.083 49.629 43.382
Comp.s’ hosts distance (t ¡ ¿) 31.669 29.505 35.930 36.562 32.620
Comp.s’ hosts ln Cons. p.c. (t ¡ ¿) 30.444 28.614 34.007 34.534 31.243
Parent-ﬁrm regressors (Selection estimation)
Indic.: Headquarters West Germany (t ¡ ¿) .973 .964 .974 .969 .974
ln Count of host countries (t ¡ ¿) 1.138 1.327 1.638 1.478 1.263
ln Employment (t ¡ ¿) 6.342 6.452 7.214 6.880 6.474
ln Equity (t ¡ ¿) 16.662 16.852 17.837 17.588 16.941
ln Liability (t ¡ ¿) 17.728 17.927 18.716 18.373 17.891
ln Capital-labor ratio (t ¡ ¿) 10.835 11.004 11.070 11.104 10.936
Parent observations 1,640 612 457 489 1,095
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001, censored (second-stage) estimation sample of 1,640 MNEs.
Notes: Averages of MNE variables are conditional on presence. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and
Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
man competitors pay.21 The wage in CEE, for example, is the average wage in the CEE countries
where competitors’ afﬁliates were located. Competitors’ labor costs abroad are arguably among
the important decision variables for an MNE’s location choice. We apply the same procedure to all
other host-country characteristics. For the annual home wage, we use sector-mean wages because
wage variables that reﬂect the workforce composition are valid predictors at the extensive margin.
203.3 Estimation sample
Table 4 reports sample means over MNEs with presence in a given location. For CEE wages
in second-stage labor-demand estimation, for instance, the table shows the location mean wage
over the foreign countries where the MNEs are present. For CEE wages in ﬁrst-stage selection
estimation, the table shows log wages paid by the competitors of the MNEs with FDI in CEE.22 In
our main estimation speciﬁcation, we consider multinational labor demand during the years 1998-
2001 for a sample of 1,640 MNEs and infer their location selection two years prior to production
from an uncensored sample of 3,392 MNEs during the years 1996-1999.23 For robustness checks,
we will also use a single cross-section of 322 MNEs in 2000 and their location selection in 1996.
The frequency of MNE presence abroad increases by two to four percentage points between 1996-
99 and 1998-2001 in all locations except WEU (Western European countries), where it slightly
falls in the censored panel.
German MNEs spend the bulk of their wage bill (79 percent) at home, because German wages
and German employment are relatively high compared to foreign locations. From German MNEs,
CEE receives labor expenditures beyond the remaining developing world combined. (Note that
shares do not add to unity across columns because averages are conditional on presence, omitting
absent MNEs). A similar cross-location pattern arises for turnover and capital stocks. Substantial
wage disparities persist across locations. Between Germany and CEE, for instance, MNE wages
differ by 2.1 log points, or a factor of around 800 percent (expf10:360 ¡ 8:286g = 8:0 for 1998-
2001). This MNE-level difference is smaller, however, than the country-population weighted wage
gap of about 1,000 percent (1=:099) in the raw UNIDO wage data in 2000 (the population-weighted
wage gap in OWW data is almost the same with 1=:098). The smaller conditional differential is
consistent with MNE selection into relative high-wage countries within the low-wage region CEE
(Marin 2004).
German MNEs in CEE, compared to any other location, face competitors in host countries that
21We consider only competitors within an MNE’s broad manufacturing sector. The eight sectors are: food; textiles
and leather; wood, pulp and paper; chemicals, rubber, plastic and energy producing materials; mineral and metal
products; machinery and equipment; transport equipment; and manufactures not elsewhere classiﬁed.
22We use the wage level at t ¡ ¿ as a regressor in selection estimation, not its log. For comparisons to the log wage
at t in Table 4, we report the log of the sample-mean wage at t ¡ ¿ (¿ = 2).
23We lose observations on the second stage (t) mainly because of missing wage information at afﬁliate locations,
whereas competitor-mean wages on the ﬁrst stage are less sensitive to missing information.
21offer the least market access, that have the smallest skill endowments, that are geographically the
closest and that exhibit the smallest per-capita consumption. The CEE wages paid by German
competitors of MNEs in CEE are below those paid by German competitors in DEV. MNEs in OIN,
at the other extreme, face German competitors with the strongest host-country market access and
host-country skill endowments.
Parent-level covariates are suggestive of selectivity effects at their means. Parents with head-
quarters in East Germany (including Berlin) are slightly more likely to expand to CEE and OIN
than the average German MNE. For all other parent-ﬁrm regressors, regional conditional means
(columns 2 to 5) exceed the unconditional mean (column 1), and regional means tend to be the
lower the higher the frequency of MNE presence. Conditional on their presence abroad, MNEs
exhibit larger home workforces, larger parent-ﬁrm equity or debt, and higher parent-ﬁrm capital-
labor ratios.
4 Estimation
We estimate the MNE model—selection equations (6) and outcomes (2)—for all locations under
Assumptions 1 and 2. Exclusion restrictions and timing provide identiﬁcation.
4.1 Identiﬁcation
The labor-demand outcome on the second stage is separately identiﬁed from location selection on
the ﬁrst stage because the MNE chooses current output, employment and capital in response to
news after location choice, whereas location-selection estimation is based on past information and
a separate set of parent-ﬁrm and competitor-level variables. Location selection on the ﬁrst stage
is separately identiﬁed from labor demand on the second stage because parent-ﬁrm variables and
competitor-level host-country attributes at decision time are among the predictors of future pres-
ence but not directly relevant for operation on the second stage other than through the propensity
of presence. Output is a regressor in cost function estimation, so no identifying assumptions on
output responses under product-market competition are needed.
We consider German home wages as exogenous to the individual MNE because German man-
ufacturing ﬁrms face bargained wage schedules from industry-speciﬁc collective agreements be-
22tween employer associations and strong unions. The threat of employment relocation abroad ar-
guably affects the outcome of collective wage bargaining. We control for the employers’ propen-
sity to select into foreign locations in parametric and nonparametric two-stage approaches so that
coefﬁcients on German home wages are adequately identiﬁed at both margins from cross-sectoral
variation. Time variation in home wages provides additional identiﬁcation.
We measure foreign labor costs with location-wide sector medians of wages and consider those
costs as exogenous to the MNE. Foreign afﬁliates of German MNEs are few and small, and ob-
served wage premia at MNEs over their local competitors do not support canonical monopsony
models of market power. For selection estimation on the ﬁrst stage, competitors’ median labor
costs by location vary across MNEs by construction, and time variation provides additional varia-
tion. For labor-demand estimation on the second stage, median foreign wages provide identiﬁca-
tion in the MNE cross section because MNEs’ country choices within aggregate locations differ so
that the exposure to median foreign wages varies across ﬁrms and over time.
Wage premia at MNEs, however, are a sign of departure from competitive labor markets and
consistent with rent sharing between the ﬁrm and its workers. As shown above, the translog cost
speciﬁcation is consistent with wage-bargaining under non-binding contracts if we use reservation-
wage measures in estimation, such as location-wide median wages. A remaining empirical concern
is that afﬁliates’ paid wages might bias the reservation-wage coefﬁcient when paid wages are
omitted from labor-demand estimation on the second stage. Suppose the disturbance includes
an MNE-wage premium over local reservation wages. A particular concern for our argument is
then that the omitted error component would bias cross-wage elasticities by distorting the wage
coefﬁcient in the outcome equation. To check for the robustness of our results to such distortion,
we use industry- and location-speciﬁc wage premia at Swedish MNE afﬁliates and include them
as regressors.
Serial correlation in the selection disturbance, due to persistence in unobserved local demand
conditions say, could contribute to the observed hysteresis of foreign presence. We therefore per-
form estimation under varying assumptions on serial correlation and consider different time hori-
zons of location selection. Repeated MNE cross sections with two-year selection-outcome lags
are our benchmark. We also obtain results under a second-order autoregressive error component
in location selection, as well as other autocorrelation speciﬁcations, and obtain results for a single
23cross-section of ﬁrms with location selection at a four-year lag. An Akaike information criterion
indicates that independent errors receive most empirical support.24
Unobserved MNE heterogeneity is a concern but mitigated in our framework and data. Our es-
timates of labor demand are based on constant-output cost-function estimation so that we explicitly
account for the heterogeneity in product-market shares. We use current capital-stock observations
as regressors in empirical analysis, viewing capital as pre-determined during location selection,
and so control for differences in capital use. We include a large set of time-varying parent-level
variables in selection estimation on the ﬁrst stage—among them MNE size, ﬁnancial measures
and productivity-related variables such as proﬁts per equity. On the second stage, inverse Mills
ratios or nonparametric propensities of foreign presence control for heterogeneity and the MNEs’
motives to conduct FDI. A remaining unobserved MNE-speciﬁc performance advantage, such as
global productivity say, would arguably cause domestic and foreign employment to expand simul-
taneously and suggest a bias of labor-demand elasticity estimates towards complementarity, but we
consistently ﬁnd cross-regional substitutability.
4.2 Location choice










Probit estimation. For probit estimation, we start by investigating the implication of Assump-
tion 1 that the selection-shock covariances between locations are constant for all locations. We
obtain estimates for the covariances from multivariate probit estimation of simultaneous selection
into the four foreign locations (on the same set of regressors as in Table 5). We fail to reject joint
equality of the six correlation coefﬁcients between the four equations with a Â2 test statistic of 4:63
(p value .592).
24Closely related to autocorrelation is the consideration of potential adjustment costs, as MNEs expand across coun-
tries within aggregate locations or as MNEs open additional plants within countries. These adjustments go beyond our
basic extensive margin of location selection with the ﬁrst employee at the ﬁrst afﬁliate and are akin to a decomposition
of the current intensive margin into additional extensive margins. In augmented regressions that condition on lagged
employment or future output, however, we ﬁnd broadly similar cross-wage elasticity estimates at both margins (not
reported for brevity) and infer that the existence of additional extensive margins behind our current intensive margins
does not seem to affect our estimate of the basic extensive margin.
24Table 5: MARGINAL EFFECTS IN POOLED PROBIT REGRESSIONS
Presence (t) CEE DEV OIN WEU
Predictors (t ¡ 2) (1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI in CEE .619 .184 .472 -.361
(.234)¤¤¤ (.270) (.299) (.293)
FDI in DEV -.001 .800 -.094 -.054
(.109) (.111)¤¤¤ (.070) (.149)
FDI in OIN -.259 -.485 -.083 -.179
(.476) (.326) (.442) (1.035)
FDI in WEU .314 .108 .009 .983
(.203) (.297) (.298) (.019)¤¤¤
Home sector wage .0004 .001 .006 .019
(.004) (.004) (.003)¤ (.007)¤¤
Competitors’ wages CEE -.050 -.023 .001 -.099
(.055) (.045) (.039) (.060)¤
Competitors’ wages OIN -.001 -.002 -.028 .025
(.015) (.016) (.015)¤ (.020)
FDI in loc. £ Home sector wage -.0007 -.005 -.015 -.020
(.005) (.004) (.004)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤
FDI in CEE £ Comp.s’ wages CEE .054 -.060 -.093 .090
(.066) (.057) (.050)¤ (.083)
FDI in OIN £ Comp.s’ wages OIN .010 .029 .035 .005
(.027) (.026) (.019)¤ (.034)
ln Count of host countries .036 .086 .031 .128
(.040) (.035)¤¤ (.028) (.053)¤¤
ln Employment .116 .057 .064 .153
(.026)¤¤¤ (.023)¤¤ (.021)¤¤¤ (.031)¤¤¤
ln Liability -.089 -.047 -.052 -.166
(.022)¤¤¤ (.019)¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤ (.026)¤¤¤
ln Capital-labor ratio .085 .023 .034 .072
(.022)¤¤¤ (.019) (.017)¤ (.026)¤¤¤
Obs. 2,413 2,413 2,413 2,413
Pseudo R2 .559 .523 .555 .457
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO wages), pooled sample of manufacturing MNEs and their majority-
owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates with two-year selection lags (¿ = 2).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Further regressors (not sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero at ﬁve percent level in any location): Competitors’ wages in DEV and WEU and their
interactions with FDI presence, Competitors’ host-country ln Market access, Indic. of Headq. West Germany, ln Eq-
uity, Parent proﬁts/equity, Competitors’ host-country skill shares, Competitors’ host-country distance, Competitors’
host-country ln Consumption per capita. Without wage-presence interactions, past presence has a marginal effect of
.779 (std. err. .022) in CEE, .671 (.027) in DEV, .713 (.026) in OIN, and .747 (.020) in WEU. Locations: CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
25The plausibility of Assumption 1 veriﬁed, we turn to probit estimation location by location and
investigate alternative speciﬁcations for serial correlation. To pick the serial-correlation speciﬁ-
cation with most empirical support, we apply the Pan (2001) extension of Akaike’s information
criterion to the general-estimation-equations probit quasi-likelihood function. By this measure,
time independence of the disturbances receives most support in every single location (compared
to hypothesized AR(1), AR(2) and stationary processes of the disturbances). We therefore choose
ordinary probit estimates as our benchmark, but will also report labor-demand elasticities under
the alternative assumption of AR(2) disturbances in Section 4.4.25
Table 5 presents the probit results as marginal effects. Among the ﬁrm-level predictors, we
include interactions between past presence indicators and wages to capture a potentially different
effect of the wage differential on an MNE with presence at a location. Past presence elsewhere
(off the diagonal) has little predictive power, but past presence for the location itself is typically a
statistically signiﬁcant and salient predictor of presence (excepting OIN where the wage-presence
interactiontakesover). IndicatorsofpastpresencealsocontrolforpermanentbutunobservedMNE
characteristics, such as lasting productivity or ownership advantages. When leaving interactions
between wages and past presence out for a comparison, past presence at the same location has a
highly statistically signiﬁcant probability effect of .779 (standard error .022) in CEE, .671 (.027) in
DEV, .713 (.026) in OIN, and .747 (.020) in WEU. The importance of past presence at the two-year
horizon is consistent with sunk costs and hysteresis in location choice.
The home wage has the expected positive sign in all regressions and is a statistically signiﬁcant
predictor for presence in OIN and WEU, both by itself and in its interaction with past presence.
The negative coefﬁcients on the interaction terms suggest that wage differentials matter less for
the location decision of MNEs that already own an afﬁliate in the region. With home wages al-
ready controlling for the foreign-to-home wage differential, several foreign wages are statistically
insigniﬁcant predictors. Insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients of foreign wages are common in the literature
on location choice (e.g. Devereux and Grifﬁth (1998) for U.S., and Buch et al. (2005) for German
MNEs). We only need home-wage coefﬁcients for the cross elasticities of substitution at the exten-
sive margin (there is no extensive margin for home where foreign wages would enter). Bootstraps
over both estimation stages will show even for the statistically weak home-wage prediction of lo-
25AnAR(2)speciﬁcationranksbetweensecondandlastintermsoftheinformationcriterion, dependingonlocation,
compared to independence, to an AR(1) and to a stationary two-year lag speciﬁcation.
26cation selection into CEE that, weighted with the strong labor demand effects of CEE selection,
the home wage signiﬁcantly affects the elasticities of labor substitution at the extensive margin.
We include a large set of MNE and host-country variables. MNE characteristics are statisti-
cally highly signiﬁcant predictors of location choice with p-values on the Â2 statistics below .001.
German MNEs with large home employment, low parent debt, and a high capital-labor ratio at the
parent ﬁrm two years ago are signiﬁcantly more likely to be present at most or all foreign locations.
The MNE’s number of host countries in the past signiﬁcantly raises the likelihood of presence. An
indicator of parents’ headquarters in West Germany, parent equity, and parent proﬁts per equity,
however, are not statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level in any location.
For location-speciﬁc variables, Â2 tests exhibit a mixed pattern with p values between .01
(DEV) and .64 (CEE). Table 5 does not report the covariates for brevity. The suppressed regressors
include wages in DEV and WEU and their interactions with past presence in DEV and WEU,
host-market access, host-country skill shares, host-country distance, and host-country per-capita
consumption. Although we transform all location covariates to the competitor level for the relevant
cross-sectional variation MNE by MNE, none of the location-speciﬁc covariates is individually
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level in any location after conditioning on location wages.26
We run the same regression as in Table 5 on the single cross section of MNEs in 2000 for a
four-year horizon, using selection predictors in 1996. Results are broadly similar and suggest that
cross-sectional variation in wages drives our results. We report the according labor-demand cross
elasticities in Section 4.4.
To gain a sense of sunk entry and exit costs behind hysteresis, we run a short descriptive re-
gression of presence in the year-2000 cross section on past presence at the location and any other
location in 1996. In this short regression, past presence is a statistically highly signiﬁcant predictor
of presence four years later at the same location; presence elsewhere serves as a rudimentary con-
trol and is also highly statistically signiﬁcant. These descriptive estimates provide an indication
of sunk cost components in probability terms. Recall that the sunk cost part of location choice
in eq. (8) can be represented as the difference between sunk entry costs and the hysteresis band.
Table 6 shows the result of this decomposition based on coefﬁcient estimates for the short descrip-
26To tentatively control for an outside margin of arm’s length trade between independent ﬁrms, we also included
a set of sector and location speciﬁc import and export measures but found the trade variables not to be statistically
signiﬁcant predictors of location choice; we leave them out of the regressions in Table 5. Results are robust to the
inclusion of year dummies.
27Table 6: SUNK ENTRY AND EXIT COSTS AT FOUR-YEAR HORIZON
Current presence (2000) CEE DEV OIN WEU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sunk entry cost: °N (1996) .525¤¤¤ 1.069¤¤¤ 1.156¤¤¤ .441¤¤¤
Sunk exit cost: °X (1996) .902¤¤¤ .412¤¤¤ .558¤¤¤ .668¤¤¤
Hysteresis band: °N + °X (1996) 1.427¤¤¤ 1.481¤¤¤ 1.714¤¤¤ 1.109¤¤¤
Marginal effect of hysteresis band (1996) .518¤¤¤ .512¤¤¤ .561¤¤¤ .421¤¤¤
Sources: MIDI 1996 and 2000, 867 manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates.
Notes: Estimates are probit coefﬁcients from a descriptive regression of current presence indicators at a location on
past presence indicators at the location and any other location. Signiﬁcance levels from Â2 tests: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten,
¤¤ ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. . Foreign locations: CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN
(Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
tive regression.27 Past presence in a given location increases the likelihood of presence four years
later by ﬁfty percent in all but WEU, where the marginal effect predicts a more than forty percent
increase. These estimates are lower than the around seventy-percent predictions at the two-year
horizon (see above), but still substantial. The descriptive decomposition suggests that entry costs
are largest in the distant low-income and high-income locations DEV and OIN, and dominate exit
costs there. Conversely, entry costs are lowest in the nearby low-income and high-income locations
CEE and WEU, and signiﬁcantly smaller than exit costs. Among the exit costs are the opportunity
costs of absence. German MNEs are considerably less reluctant to leave distant locations DEV
and OIN than they abandon the neighboring locations CEE or WEU.
Nonparametric propensity score estimation. To break the curse of dimensionality, we choose
seven core predictors and a polynomial approximation around them, while we linearly condition
on the set of remaining ﬁrm and host-country variables. For the choice of the seven core variables
we use existing evidence in the FDI literature to guide us: market access (Head and Mayer 2004)
and the count of an MNE’s past host countries (Buch et al. 2005) are regarded as important predic-
tors. For purposes of our estimation, wages in the ﬁve aggregate locations belong among the core
variables. To query the appropriate order of the polynomial expansion around the core variables,
we use two criteria. Cross validation lends slightly more support to a second-order polynomial
27The sunk cost decomposition involves an estimate of the constant so that entry and exit costs cannot be expressed
in marginal probability terms of their own. A marginal probability measure can be inferred for their sum, the hysteresis
band.
28in the core variables. But F tests show that more wage predictors are statistically signiﬁcant in a
third-order polynomial speciﬁcation. We report nonparametric results from a third-order polyno-
mial expansion here, yet ultimate elasticity estimates differ little. As to serial correlation, we ﬁnd
the speciﬁcation with independent disturbances to exhibit a better ﬁt than serial correlation, similar
to probit estimation.
Table 7 reports coefﬁcient estimates by location. The predicted propensity scores of location
choice are .338 for CEE, .291 for DEV, .262 for OIN and .617 for WEU—slightly under-predicting
the actual frequencies of presence in Table 4 but reﬂecting the relative frequencies across locations.
Marginal effects are close to those in the probit regressions. Estimates of past presence indicators
along the diagonal continue to have a magnitude similar to probit estimation. When leaving in-
teractions between wages and past presence out, past presence at the same location has a highly
statistically signiﬁcant probability effect of .759 (standard error .018) in CEE, .668 (.020) in DEV,
.711 (.017) in OIN, and .707 (.024) in WEU. Inclusion of wage interactions with past presence
shifts much predictive power to the interaction terms in DEV and all predictive power to the inter-
action terms in OIN. In WEU, the interaction term countervails the high marginal effects of past
presence.
Table 7 presents F-tests of joint signiﬁcance of individual wages for p values at or below the
.1 threshold. Similar to probit estimation, polynomial terms that involve home wages predict loca-
tion choice more successfully than most foreign wages (except OIN wages). Home wages are the
predictors we need for cross elasticities at the extensive margin. Series terms involving the home
sector wage predict selection into DEV and OIN at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level. Signiﬁcant
parent-level covariates from probit estimation remain signiﬁcant predictors under nonparametric
estimation, excepting the host country count variable. Similarly, statistically insigniﬁcant parent-
level covariates remain insigniﬁcant, and insigniﬁcant host-country variables continue insigniﬁ-
cant.
4.3 Labor demand estimation with selectivity correction










29Table 7: MARGINAL EFFECTS IN NONPARAMETRIC PROBABILITY MODEL
Presence (t) CEE DEV OIN WEU
Predictors (t ¡ 2) (1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI in CEE .644 .108 .193 -.207
(.145)¤¤¤ (.149) (.138) (.184)
FDI in DEV -.070 .383 -.065 -.007
(.088) (.116)¤¤¤ (.083) (.107)
FDI in OIN .016 .060 .068 .075
(.553) (.568) (.550) (.687)
FDI in WEU .174 -.122 -.057 1.082
(.222) (.215) (.201) (.258)¤¤¤
FDIa in loc. £ Home sector wage .001 .006 -.010 -.004
(.003) (.004)¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.004)
FDI in OIN £ Comp.s’ wages OIN -.001 -.002 .031 -.003
(.018) (.018) (.017)¤ (.022)
Series terms of wages: p-values from F tests
Home sector wage terms .041 .021
Competitors’ CEE wage terms
Competitors’ DEV wage terms
Competitors’ OIN wage terms .012 .052
Competitors’ WEU wage terms
ln Employment .064 .039 .049 .090
(.014)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤ (.013)¤¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤
ln Liability -.046 -.028 -.036 -.094
(.011)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤ (.011)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤
ln Capital-labor ratio .046 .020 .028 .045
(.011)¤¤¤ (.012)¤ (.011)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤
Obs. 2,413 2,413 2,413 2,413
R2 .666 .618 .633 .556
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO wages), pooled sample of manufacturing MNEs and their majority-
owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates with two-year selection lags (¿ = 2).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Further regressors (not signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero at ﬁve percent level in any location): Interactions of competitors’ wages in CEE/DEV/WEU
with FDI presence in CEE/DEV/WEU, Competitors’ host-country ln Market access, ln Count of host countries, Indic.
of Headquarters West Germany, ln Equity, Parent proﬁts/equity, Competitors’ host-country skill shares, Competitors’
host-country distance, Competitors’ host-country ln Cons. p.c. Without wage-presence interactions, past presence
has a marginal effect of .759 (standard error .018) in CEE, .668 (.020) in DEV, .711 (.017) in OIN, and .707 (.024)
in WEU. Locations: CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized
countries), WEU (Western Europe).
aFDI presence in regression location.
30for all locations. We stack MNE observations with different presence choices abroad by setting
regressors for locations of absence to zero, and include absence indicators accordingly (see Ap-
pendix B for natural assumptions underlying stacking). For parametric correction, we include the
predicted selectivity hazard (inverse of the Mills ratio) from the ﬁrst stage among the regressors.
Under nonparametric correction, we include the predicted propensity scores from the ﬁrst-stage
estimates. We use cross validation to choose the order of polynomial expansion at this stage. A
third-order approximation performs better in CEE and DEV (but worse in OIN and WEU); we
use a third-order approximation because much of our interest lies on CEE. In both parametric and
nonparametric regressions we include absence indicators among the predictors to prevent stacking
bias.
We implement the second-stage estimation for all but one location (excluding home) by iter-
ating Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) over the estimated disturbance co-
variance matrix until the estimates converge. This is equivalent to maximum-likelihood estimation
(Dhrymes 1971) and makes estimation invariant to the deleted location equation (Barten 1969).
Through constraints, we impose linear homogeneity in factor prices and symmetry of wage coefﬁ-
cients (see Appendix A). We treat induced heteroskedasticity following Heckman (1979), resulting
in different standard errors on symmetric coefﬁcients.
Table 8 presents estimates of translog cost function equations for 1,640 stacked MNE obser-
vations between 1998 and 2001. Beyond the reported wage coefﬁcients, the equations include the
full sets of turnover and ﬁxed asset regressors, the scaled equivalent of the constant, and indica-
tors of absence from all other locations. All but two wage coefﬁcients in Table 8 are signiﬁcantly
different from zero at the one percent level, and all coefﬁcients but one are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve
percent level in each, parametric and nonparametric, regression. Most coefﬁcients on output and
ﬁxed assets (not reported) are similarly highly signiﬁcant.
Estimates in the upper panel of Table 8 include the predicted selectivity hazards (inverses of
Mills ratios) by location (Assumption 1). Selectivity hazards are statistically different from zero
at the one percent level in all equations except DEV (signiﬁcance at ten-percent level). The lower
panel presents estimates from nonparametric selectivity correction (Assumption 2), using third-
order polynomials in the location’s propensity score interacted with indicators for presence at all
other locations. Â2 tests on the series terms overwhelmingly reject their joint equality to zero. The
31Table 8: TRANSLOG COST PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Employment in:a CEE DEV OIN WEU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parametric Selectivity Correction (Assumption 1)
ln Wagesa
HOM .020 -.002 .078 .183
(.001)¤¤¤ (.0008)¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
CEE -.008 -.001 -.003 -.008
(.0008)¤¤¤ (.0002)¤¤¤ (.0004)¤¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤
DEV -.001 .001 -.002 .004
(.0003)¤¤¤ (.0008) (.0004)¤¤¤ (.0006)¤¤¤
OIN -.003 -.002 -.112 .039
(.00007)¤¤¤ (.00007)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤
WEU -.008 .004 .039 -.219
(.0001)¤¤¤ (.0001)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤
Selectivity hazard 81.487 32.872 33.468 92.618
(15.830)¤¤¤ (17.751)¤ (12.462)¤¤¤ (16.618)¤¤¤
R2 .945 .950 .966 .932
Nonparametric Selectivity Correction (Assumption 2)
ln Wagesa
HOM .022 .001 .073 .145
(.001)¤¤¤ (.001) (.005)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤
CEE -.007 -.003 -.003 -.009
(.0008)¤¤¤ (.0004)¤¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤ (.0006)¤¤¤
DEV -.003 .0008 -.002 .003
(.0004)¤¤¤ (.0009) (.0006)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤
OIN -.003 -.002 -.109 .040
(.0005)¤¤¤ (.0006)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤
WEU -.009 .003 .040 -.179
(.0006)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤
Series terms
Â2 tests (p-value) 618.4 (.000) 457.6 (.000) 183.5 (.000) 293.0 (.000)
R2 .956 .957 .967 .929
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO wages).
Notes: Stacked observations of 1,640 MNEs. Further regressors: ln Turnover, ln Fixed assets, Absence indicators,
Transformed constant (in parametric selectivity regression). Standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤
ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Standard errors corrected for ﬁrst-stage estimation of selectivity hazards (hence not symmet-
ric on restricted coefﬁcients). Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing
countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
aTransformed wage-bill shares and regressors.
32Table 9: CROSS-WAGE ELASTICITIES UNDER PARAMETRIC SELECTIVITY
Wage change (by 1%) in
Employment HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU
change (%) in (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HOM intensive -.574¤¤¤ .051¤¤¤ .011 .150¤¤¤ .361¤¤¤
CEE intensive only 1.596¤¤¤ -1.295¤¤¤ -.039 -.081 -.181
extensive only .795¤¤¤ -1.250¤¤¤ .071 .155 -.097
DEV intensive only .651 -.071 -.912¤¤¤ -.116 .448¤¤
extensive only .772¤¤¤ -.250 -.982¤¤¤ .324 .656
OIN intensive only 2.328¤¤¤ -.040 -.031 -3.160¤¤¤ .903¤¤¤
extensive only .960¤¤¤ -.288 .032 -2.597¤ .365
WEU intensive only 2.214¤¤¤ -.036¤ .048¤¤ .358¤¤¤ -2.584¤¤¤
extensive only 1.016¤¤¤ -.341 .128 1.137¤ -.951¤¤¤
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO wages).
Notes: Elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins from 1,640 stacked MNE observations. Underlying labor
demand estimates from parametric selectivity-corrected ISUR estimates (Assumption 1, Tables 5 and 8). Standard
errors from 200 bootstraps: ¤¤ signiﬁcance at ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and
Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
translog cost function regressors predict the bulk of labor demand variation across locations, with
the R2 goodness of ﬁt ranging between .93 and .97 across equations. The regression ﬁt is similar
under parametric and nonparametric selectivity correction. Overall, we view the signiﬁcance of
selectivity correction terms as evidence for the importance of the extensive margin.
Elasticities of multinational labor substitution. We repeat joint selection (6) and outcome (2)
estimation in 200 bootstraps to infer elasticities of labor substitution (4) and their standard errors
at both margins.28
Table 9 shows own-wage and cross-wage substitution elasticities for permanent wage changes
by one percent in different locations, separately for the extensive and the intensive margins. There
is no well-deﬁned extensive margin for selection into the home location in a sample of MNEs that
are observed only if active in the home location. One margin at a time is set to zero to isolate the
effect at the other margin. While the plain log wage effects on wage bill shares are additive over
the two margins, cross-wage substitution elasticities are not additive by eq. (4).
28Bootstrapping is advantageous because it does not require treatment of insigniﬁcant wage coefﬁcients from the
ﬁrst stage to quantify the extensive margin. Moreover, Eakin, McMillen and Buono (1990) show in simulations that
analytic conﬁdence intervals for elasticity estimates can widely differ from bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals.
33Own-wage elasticities along the diagonal—for both intensive and extensive margins—are uni-
formly and signiﬁcantly negative, as production theory requires. While this might be expected for
estimates at the intensive margin, it is a reassuring ﬁnding for estimates at the extensive margin. As
is common, we impose linear homogeneity in factor prices and symmetry of wage coefﬁcients at
the intensive margin through constraints on the translog regression. But we do not restrict estimates
at the extensive margin—neither under parametric nor nonparametric selectivity correction. The
own-wage elasticity of substitution is considerably larger in most foreign locations than at home,
suggesting that MNE employment abroad responds more sensitively to labor costs there than home
employment responds to home wages.
Cross-wage elasticities in the ﬁrst row (foreign wage effects on home employment) and in the
ﬁrst column (home wage effects on foreign employment) are signiﬁcantly positive for eleven out
of thirteen estimates at the intensive and the extensive margins. A one-percent reduction in the
wage in CEE, for instance, is associated with a .05 percent drop in home employment at German
MNE parents. In contrast, a one-percent increase in the German sector wage is associated with a
1.6 percent boost to MNE employment in CEE at the intensive margin and a .8 percent boost at
the extensive margin. So, home and CEE employment are substitutes within MNEs. The large
difference in cross-wage effects between ﬁrst row and ﬁrst column is consistent with two stylized
facts. First, employment at German MNE parents is larger in levels than at their CEE afﬁliates so
that a smaller percentage wage drop in Germany means a larger reduction in employment abroad
in absolute terms. Second, CEE workers have an arguably lower labor productivity than German
workers so that CEE employment levels are more responsive to a given foreign wage change.
The extensive margin is a noticeable component of adjustment, beyond its crucial role in cor-
recting cost function estimates for location selectivity bias. We ﬁnd that elasticities at the extensive
margin are strictly positive. So, home and foreign employment are substitutes within MNEs not
only at the intensive but also at the extensive margin. Although the CEE and DEV home wage
effects on selection were not statistically different from zero on the ﬁrst stage with probit (Ta-
ble 5), the strong signiﬁcance of the selection effect on labor demand on the second stage in CEE
(selectivity hazard coefﬁcient in Table 8) turns home wage effects into signiﬁcant predictors of
employment substitution at the extensive margin.
Elasticities at the extensive margin are smaller in magnitude than at the intensive margin in
34the geographically close locations CEE and WEU, and in OIN. In DEV, however, the extensive
margin dominates the statistically insigniﬁcant elasticity at the intensive margin and we ﬁnd a .8
percent increase in DEV employment in response to a one-percent home wage increase—similar
in magnitude to that in CEE.
Bootstrapping allows us to test whether the elasticities at the intensive margin are statistically
signiﬁcantly different from the total elasticities. We reject equality for DEV, OIN and WEU (with
t statistics between 2.1 and 16.6) on UNIDO wages and reject their equality for all locations (t
statistics between 4.1 and 21.4) on OWW wages, corroborating the importance of the extensive
margin.
Cross-wage estimates beyond the ﬁrst row and column are for the most part not statistically
different from zero. Notable exceptions at the intensive margin are signiﬁcant pairs of positive
cross-wage effects involving WEU: on the one hand of OIN on WEU (.36) and vice versa (.90),
and on the other hand of DEV on WEU (.05) and vice versa (.45). The signiﬁcantly positive and
mutually consistent effects suggest that MNE employment is a substitute at the intensive margin
between OIN and WEU and between DEV and WEU. The substitution effect is also corroborated
by a positive cross-wage elasticity between OIN and WEU (1.14) at the extensive margin.
Overall, our estimation strategy ﬁnds labor in one location to be a substitute to labor else-
where. In the absence of a correction for the extensive margin, conventional translog estimates
for the intensive margin in our data would result in under-estimated coefﬁcients for 15 out of 25
coefﬁcients—a bias towards complementarity (see Table F.1 in the Appendix). Following Harri-
son and McMillan (2006), we also split the sample into MNEs in industries with no signiﬁcant
intra-ﬁrm trade (horizontal FDI) and with signiﬁcant intra-ﬁrm trade (vertical FDI); we do not ﬁnd
home and foreign employment to be complements in any industry or location, whereas Harrison
and McMillan (2006) ﬁnd complementarity for wages in low-income locations and home employ-
ment. Harrison and McMillan (2006) restrict the sample to manufacturing afﬁliates, as we do. So,
the different ﬁndings for vertical FDI industries and afﬁliates in low-income locations may be due
to differences in economic behavior between U.S. MNEs and German MNEs, or due to empirical
method.
35Table 10: FOREIGN-WAGE ELASTICITIES OF HOME EMPLOYMENT
Wage change (1%) in
Home employment HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU Obs.
change (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stacking
Ass. 1, UNIDO 98-01 -.574 .051 .011 .150 .361 1,640
(.062)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.008) (.028)¤¤¤ (.037)¤¤¤
Ass. 1, UNIDO 00 -.631 .062 .034 .202 .332 322
(.115)¤¤¤ (.026)¤¤ (.021) (.071)¤¤¤ (.078)¤¤¤
Ass. 1 AR(2), UNIDO 98-01 -.576 .051 .012 .151 .363 1,640
(.081)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤ (.012) (.034)¤¤¤ (.046)¤¤¤
Ass. 1, UNIDO 98-01, IUI ¢w -.592 .048 .011 .168 .365 1,640
(.056)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.007) (.029)¤¤¤ (.033)¤¤¤
Ass. 1, OWW 98-01 -.477 .051 -.002 .209 .219 1,458
(.053)¤¤¤ (.010)¤¤¤ (.005) (.030)¤¤¤ (.037)¤¤¤
Ass. 2, UNIDO 98-01 -.525 .053 .015 .144 .313 1,640
(.051)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤ (.024)¤¤¤ (.035)¤¤¤
Omnipresent MNEs
Ass. 1, UNIDO 98-01 -1.354 .090 -.021 .526 .758 93
(.209)¤¤¤ (.104) (.048) (.135)¤¤¤ (.143)¤¤¤
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO and OWW wages, IUI wage premia).
Notes: Elasticities of wage effects on home employment (ﬁrst row of elasticity matrix) at the intensive margin. Stan-
dard errors from 200 bootstraps: ¤¤ signiﬁcance at ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central
and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
4.4 Speciﬁcation comparisons
To assess the robustness of our estimates, we compare several speciﬁcations and report the ﬁrst
rows of the cross-wage elasticity matrices (foreign wage effects on home employment) in Table 10,
and the ﬁrst columns separately by intensive and extensive margin in Tables 11 and 12 (home wage
effects on foreign employment).
Foreign-wage elasticities of home employment in Table 10 are robust across speciﬁcations.
Estimates on our benchmark sample (ﬁrst row) with UNIDO wages and MNEs between 1998 and
2001 under Assumption 1 conform closely to several other speciﬁcations. The similarity between
the 1998-2001 MNE sample and the single cross section of MNEs in 2000 (with location choice
in 1996) in the second row is consistent with the view that cross sectional and not time series
variation is the main source of identiﬁcation at the intensive margin. The third row shows that an
AR(2) error speciﬁcation in the selection equation results in only minimal differences in cross-
36Table 11: HOME-WAGE ELASTICITIES AT THE INTENSIVE MARGIN
Home wage change (1%), by regression speciﬁcation
Stacking Omnipr.
UNIDO UNIDO UNIDO UNIDO, IUI OWW UNIDO UNIDO
98-01 00 98-01AR(2) 98-01¢w 98-01 98-01 98-01
Emplmt. Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 2 Ass. 1
chg. (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CEE 1.596 1.810 1.599 1.503 1.366 1.648 3.535
(.218)¤¤¤ (.748)¤¤ (.464)¤¤¤ (.194)¤¤¤ (.247)¤¤¤ (.226)¤¤¤ (4.062)
DEV .651 1.534 .669 .650 -.147 .880 -.444
(.466) (1.004) (.722) (.430) (.480) (.397)¤¤ (1.072)
OIN 2.328 2.573 2.330 2.593 3.540 2.235 1.938
(.432)¤¤¤ (.888)¤¤¤ (.572)¤¤¤ (.421)¤¤¤ (.516)¤¤¤ (.363)¤¤¤ (.482)¤¤¤
WEU 2.214 1.860 2.222 2.235 2.087 1.915 2.851
(.224)¤¤¤ (.407)¤¤¤ (.287)¤¤¤ (.201)¤¤¤ (.353)¤¤¤ (.205)¤¤¤ (.494)¤¤¤
Obs. 1,640 322 1,640 1,640 1,458 1,640 93
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO and OWW wages, IUI wage premia).
Notes: Elasticities of home wage effects on foreign employment (ﬁrst column of elasticity matrix) at the intensive
margin. Standard errors from 200 bootstraps: ¤¤ signiﬁcance at ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: CEE (Central and
Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
wage elasticity estimates. In row four, we include industry-speciﬁc MNE wage premia by location
on the second stage, using IUI wage data for afﬁliates of Swedish MNEs for 1998; only minor
changes to coefﬁcient estimates result. OWW wage data in the ﬁfth row lead to smaller estimation
samples but coefﬁcient estimates are similar across wage data.29
Nonparametric estimation under Assumption 2 does not yield statistically different estimates,
excepting DEV (row six). The subsample of 93 omnipresent MNEs between 1996 and 2001 is
small but results in signiﬁcant outcome estimates on the second stage (last row); the magnitude of
cross-wage elasticity estimates, when signiﬁcant, is considerably larger than for the stacked sam-
ples, suggesting that home employment at omnipresent MNEs responds more elastically to foreign
wage changes. Estimates for DEV are not signiﬁcant except for nonparametric speciﬁcations.
This is consistent with the assertion that higher-order series terms in the outcome regression help
remove bias that parametric selectivity correction cannot prevent with a single selectivity hazard.
Home-wage elasticities of foreign employment at the intensive margin are robust too, as Ta-
ble 11 shows. Estimates on our benchmark sample (now in the ﬁrst column) conform closely to
29We ﬁnd similar results using UBS wage data.
37Table 12: HOME-WAGE ELASTICITIES AT THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN
Home wage change (1%), by regression speciﬁcation
Stacking Omnipr.
UNIDO UNIDO UNIDO UNIDO, IUI OWW UNIDO UNIDO
98-01 00 98-01AR(2) 98-01¢w 98-01 98-01 98-01
Emplmt. Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 1 Ass. 2 Ass. 1
chg. (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CEE .795 .838 .911 .769 .395 -.040 .643
(.201)¤¤¤ (.232)¤¤¤ (.289)¤¤¤ (.058)¤¤¤ (.380) (9.586) (.300)¤¤
DEV .772 .572 1.200 .603 .975 3.941 .592
(.162)¤¤¤ (.252)¤¤ (.580)¤¤ (.182)¤¤¤ (.298)¤¤¤ (17.680) (.503)
OIN .960 1.116 .774 .792 1.431 -4.249 .345
(.340)¤¤¤ (.392)¤¤¤ (.272)¤¤¤ (.182)¤¤¤ (.845)¤ (7.373) (.331)
WEU 1.016 1.183 .521 .979 1.561 -2.457 .719
(.171)¤¤¤ (.301)¤¤¤ (.759) (.093)¤¤¤ (.372)¤¤¤ (3.141) (.096)¤¤¤
Obs. 1,640 322 1,640 1,640 1,458 1,640 93
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO and OWW wages, IUI wage premia).
Notes: Elasticities of home wage effects on foreign employment (ﬁrst column of elasticity matrix) at the extensive
margin. Standard errors from 200 bootstraps: ¤¤ signiﬁcance at ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: CEE (Central and
Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
several other speciﬁcations. In fact, the comments on the rows of Table 10 above apply also to
the columns of Table 11, except only that the signiﬁcant cross-wage elasticity estimates for the
subsample of omnipresent MNEs now closely resemble those from other speciﬁcations.
At the extensive margin, Table 12 documents that home-wage elasticities of foreign employ-
ment are (highly) signiﬁcant in the parametric speciﬁcations (columns 1 through 5). Neither an
AR(2) error speciﬁcation for selection, nor the inclusion of industry and location-speciﬁc MNE
wage premia on the second stage, nor the use of OWW wage data yield a signiﬁcantly differ-
ent elasticity estimate at any location. Under AR(2) selection disturbances, CEE and DEV point
estimates increase while OIN and WEU point estimates drop (the latter to a level that is statis-
tically indistinguishable from zero but also statistically indistinguishable from the benchmark).
With OWW wage data, all elasticity point estimates but the one for CEE increase. Nonparametric
estimates of elasticities at the extensive margin are sample means of the ﬁrst derivatives of our
third-order polynomial series expansions. We compute the elasticities after dropping those outlier
predictions for which the ﬁrst-stage probability model would result in propensity scores outside the
zero-one range. Nonparametric estimates for the extensive margin (columns 5 and 6 of Table 12)
38are not statistically different from zero but similar in magnitude when plausible (column 5, except-
ing DEV). Although the inclusion of nonparametric series terms in labor demand estimation yields
more precise estimates of intensive margin coefﬁcients (Tables 10 and 11 before), the series terms
do not seem to provide a precise estimate of the extensive margin itself. The similarity between
parametric and plausible nonparametric estimates is nevertheless an indication that our paramet-
ric benchmark estimates of the extensive margin are reasonable. Point estimates for omnipresent
MNEs (column 7) are smaller than in the benchmark speciﬁcation, arguably because this selected
sample expands to foreign locations more frequently.
In summary, robustness checks conﬁrm the statistical plausibility of the benchmark estimates
in Table 9 under parametric selectivity correction (Assumption 1). Nonparametric estimates (As-
sumption 2) are similar and highly signiﬁcant at the intensive margin, but fail to attain statistical
signiﬁcance at the extensive margin.
4.5 Country groups by initial wage quartile
We turn to the robustness of our aggregate location deﬁnition by considering a different division
of world regions: we split the world into the home country and four artiﬁcial locations deﬁned by
the quartiles of UNIDO manufacturing wages in the initial sample year 1996. We report estimated
cross-wage elasticities at the two margins in Table F.3 in the Appendix. Four striking facts emerge.
First, on-diagonal entries remain signiﬁcantly negative and magnitudes off the diagonal exhibit
substitutability when statistically signiﬁcant. Second, quartiles 1 and 3, which happen to contain
more distant countries from Germany, do not show statistically signiﬁcant foreign-wage elasticities
on home employment at the intensive margin and do not show statistically signiﬁcant home-wage
elasticities on foreign employment at the selection margin, similar to the distant DEV location
before. These two facts corroborate our ﬁndings for the aggregate locations. Third, estimates at
the selection margin show scant variability off the diagonal for any given column. An economic
interpretation is that the selection margin is not well deﬁned for the artiﬁcial four-quartile regions
that lack geographical and institutional coherence. Fourth, more off-diagonal entries of intensive-
margin estimates are statistically signiﬁcant than under our aggregate location deﬁnition. An eco-
nomic interpretation is that outcome-margin substitutability cuts across the artiﬁcial four-quartile
regions more frequently than across the geographically and institutionally related aggregate loca-
39Table 13: COUNTERFACTUAL EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF A ONE-PERCENT REDUCTION IN
THE HOME-FOREIGN WAGE GAP
Permanent wage gap reduction
by one percent between Home and
Employment effect CEE DEV OIN WEU
at the intensive margin on (1) (2) (3) (4)
Homea 728 161 2141 5143
(101)¤¤¤ (118) (401)¤¤¤ (526)¤¤¤
Foreignb extensive margin -1,954 -2,567 -3,066 -4,010
(493)¤¤¤ (537)¤¤¤ (1084)¤¤¤ (674)¤¤¤
Foreignb total -3,951 -2,128 -7,999 -9,656
(734)¤¤¤ (1698) (1933)¤¤¤ (1162)¤¤¤
Sources: Own calculations based on selectivity corrected translog estimates for 1,640 German manufacturing MNEs
and their majority-owned foreign manufacturing afﬁliates in MIDI and USTAN between 1996 and 2001 (UNIDO wages).
Notes: Point estimates from parametric selectivity correction (Assumption 1, Table 9) multiplied by employment in
2000 (Table 1). Standard errors from 200 bootstraps: ¤¤ signiﬁcance at ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Home (Germany), CEE
(Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western
Europe).
aGap reducing foreign wage increases (by one percent).
bGap reducing home wage reduction (by one percent).
tions. The latter two facts support our deﬁnitions of aggregate locations as more coherent.
4.6 Counterfactual evaluation
We now turn to the economic importance of our estimates for multinational labor substitution. Our
hypothetical experiment is a permanent change in the wage differential between home and foreign
locations. How much larger would parent employment be if the wage gap to foreign locations nar-
rowed? How much smaller would afﬁliate employment be? Counterfactual predictions in Table 13
give answers to these questions.
We use the home-wage elasticities of foreign employment and the foreign-wage elasticities of
home employment from benchmark estimates in Table 9. These estimates reﬂect the mean MNE’s
labor-demand response (the mean MNE in the stacked sample has propensities of presence abroad
as in the ﬁrst row of Table 4). We multiply the elasticity estimates with the workforce totals
in Table 1 and obtain the implied employment changes from one-percent increases in wages by
margin.
A one percent smaller wage gap between Germany and locations in CEE, for instance, is as-
40sociated with around 730 more jobs at German parents and 4,000 less jobs at afﬁliates in CEE.
CEE afﬁliates tend to have smaller work forces and, arguably, lower labor productivity than Ger-
man establishments so that employment in CEE is more sensitive to home wage changes than
home employment responds to foreign wages. The labor substitution effects of one-percent wage
changes between home locations and CEE are smaller than the effects relative to OIN or WEU. In
absolute magnitude, however, a closing of the HOM-CEE wage gap by half at constant elastici-
ties results in larger employment effects than a reduction of the HOM-OIN or HOM-WEU wage
gaps by half. Using country populations as weights for location mean UNIDO wages, CEE wages
are, on average, 9.9 percent of the German level in 2000 (population-weighted mean OWW wages
in CEE are 9.8 percent). If the estimated elasticities of substitution are constant at all levels of
wages, an increase in CEE wages by 450%(= [(1¡:099)=2]=:099) to reduce the wage gap vis-` a-vis
Germany by half in 2000 would bring 330,000 (= 730 ¢ 450) counterfactual manufacturing jobs
(with a standard error of 45,000 jobs) to Germany—around a quarter of the estimated home em-
ployment at German manufacturing MNEs in 2000 (Table 1). If international wage gaps shrink at
a similar rate as per capita GDP converges to steady state and Germany is close to its steady state,
the CEE-German wage gap would take around 35 years to contract to half its present size (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 1992). The UNIDO wage level in WEU is 78.6 percent of that in Germany so
that an increase in WEU wages by 14% to cut the gap by about half would attract only 70,000
counterfactual manufacturing jobs to the German plants of German manufacturing MNEs.
Elasticities of labor substitution are local properties of the MNE’s cost function, however, and
the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution at all wage levels is coarse. The rough cal-
culations above are merely intended to put an economic meaning to the abstract elasticity ﬁgures.
In our view, the magnitude of our calculations for constant elasticities nonetheless underscores the
potential importance of job substitution within MNEs for labor market outcomes. The calcula-
tions also highlight that marginal elasticity estimates alone can be misleading indicators of job loss
unless the elasticity point estimates are weighted with the prevailing wage gaps.
415 Conclusion
The public discourse on offshoring espouses the idea that multinational enterprises (MNEs) sub-
stitute jobs at home for foreign employment. But economic studies on MNE labor demand across
locations have found weak or no evidence of job substitution. We integrate two distinct branches
of the literature—one on predictions of MNEs’ location choices, and one on labor substitutabil-
ity across established MNE locations—into a single econometric model that corrects labor-demand
estimation for location selectivity. In our framework, multinational labor demand responds to wage
differentials across locations both at the extensive margin, when an MNE expands into foreign lo-
cations, and at the intensive margin, when an MNE reallocates jobs across existing afﬁliates. We
derive conditions for common Heckman (1979) selectivity corrections, location by location, and
for nonparametric identiﬁcation. Our novel estimation strategy detects a frequent complementarity
bias in estimates from conventional uncorrected methods.
Empirical evidence on German manufacturing MNEs shows that ﬁrms change multinational
presence only infrequently and hardly alter their number of afﬁliates within regions. These scant
changes to multinational presence at the extensive margin are associated with salient labor de-
mand effects in response to permanent wage differentials across locations. With every percentage
increase in Central and Eastern European wages, for instance, German manufacturing MNEs are
found to allocate 730 MNE jobs to Germany. Similarly, with every percentage increase in German
wages, German MNEs allocate 2,000 jobs to Central and Eastern Europe at the extensive margin
and 4,000 jobs in total. Given the sizeable wage differential between Germany and Central and
Eastern Europe (requiring a 450 percent increase in Eastern European wages in 2000 to reduce the
gap by half), we conclude that international wage differentials have a pronounced impact on multi-
national labor substitution. As the wage gaps to CEE countries narrow, our estimates lead us to
expect that CEE jobs are relocated to Germany. This prediction is consistent with recent industry
and press reports on German MNEs that repatriate jobs.
The estimated employment responses reﬂect MNEs’ global employment decisions, given their
product-market shares. In industry equilibrium, at least two additional employment effects might
arise. First, MNEswithcostormarket-accessadvantagesafterforeigndirectinvestmentmightgain
product-market shares and consequently employment. But, second, competitors at whose expense
MNEs’ product-market shares expand might lose employment. Measuring the net employment
42effect in market equilibrium remains a task for future research. Naturally, an essential aspect of
reallocations in equilibrium is the production reallocation within MNEs at the extensive and the
intensive margin.
43Appendix
A Multiproduct translog cost function
Consider the short-run multiproduct translog function with quasi-ﬁxed capital:30

























































































By Shepard’s lemma, MNE j’s demand for employment y`
jt is equal to @Cjt=@w`
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for ` = 1;:::;L. We transform these L equations into L simultaneous labor demand functions by






t as in eq. (1).
With L locations, there are L(L¡1)=2 symmetry restrictions ±k` = ±`k for any k;`. Lin-
ear homogeneity in factor prices requires that
PL








`=1 ±n` = 0 for all n. We impose these restrictions on intensive-margin estimation
but do not constrain extensive-margin coefﬁcients.
B Stacking
Eq. (1) requires treatment for locations of absence because outputs and capital inputs are missing
where MNEs do not operate. Our maintained assumptions imply that stacking of observations is a
30Slaughter (2000) adds ln(k=q) terms to a version of (A1). Given the additive logarithmic structure, this is equiv-
alent to an afﬁne transformation of the parameter pairs (®k;³k) and (¹k;`;·k;`) because ln(k=q) = lnk ¡ lnq.
44viable and attractive procedure.31 Stacking means that we set regressors for locations of absence
to zero. Stacking is easily implemented, improves efﬁciency, collapses the up to 2L¡1 ¡ 1 sets of
estimates into one consistently estimated (L¡1)-equation system, and provides a single L £ L
matrix of estimates for wage elasticities of regional labor demands.
More formally, stacking interacts the parameters in (1) with presence indicators: ¹`n=0 when
no output is produced at location n, and ·`n = ±`n = 0 when MNE j employs no factors at location
n. Stacking is permissible under three natural assumptions in our framework: (i) all MNEs face the
same sunk cost function F `
j;t¡¿ conditional on prior presence (so that presence is mean independent
of inputs); (ii) MNEs face an identical short-run cost function C(¢) in all locations of presence (but
not necessarily where absent) conditional on characteristics (so that a common parameter vector is
justiﬁed); and (iii) the disturbances ²`
jt are uncorrelated across observations of MNEs i and j. To
prevent any bias from stacking, we include a set of absence indicators (1¡d
n6=`
jt ) in the outcome
equation. Absence indicators control for shadow inputs. To check robustness of the stacking
procedure, we repeat estimation for the subsample of omnipresent MNEs that operate afﬁliates in
all locations.
C Parametric selection correction
Given our parametric cost function, a parametric approach to selectivity is a natural benchmark.
Plausible distributional assumptions permit individual Heckman (1979) corrections location by
location.32 Consider linear selection predictions H(zj;t¡¿) = zj;t¡¿°` and jointly normally dis-
tributed disturbances (²k
jt;´`
j;t¡¿) so that a probit model describes the choice of presence (6).
The correlation between ²n
jt and ´`
j;t¡¿ across separate locations n 6= ` is crucial for estimation
of outcomes (2). Our data reject independence of ²n
jt and ´`
j;t¡¿.33 To specify the correlation
31Estimation of separate equation systems for all possible presence patterns is plagued by dimensionality: potential
presence in up to L ¡ 1 locations outside home means that there are up to 2L¡1 ¡ 1 regional presence patterns. Lee
and Pitt (1986) propose an estimator related to Neary and Roberts’s (1980) shadow price approach. Koebel (2006)
conducts Box-Cox transformations on inputs.
32For multivariate selectivity, an extension of the univariate Heckman (1979) estimator has a complicated form
(conditional moments of multivariate normal distributions have no known closed form for multiple truncations, see
Kotz, Balakrishnan and Johnson (2000)). Simulated maximum-likelihood would be a viable technique but requires
joint multivariate normality, which we prefer to relax in nonparametric estimation.
33SUR estimation of the outcome equations shows that ²n
jt and ²`
jt correlate so that ²n
jt and ´`




45structure, we depart from the idea that selection disturbances include both location-speciﬁc parts
such as, for example, surprising changes to proﬁt repatriation policies in the host country and
include MNE-speciﬁc parts such as idiosyncratic shocks to a ﬁrm’s sunk entry costs. Changes
to host-country repatriation policies affect the entry decision. But once the MNE operates in the
host country, it minimizes costs irrespective of entry-related host-country shocks. So, we consider
it plausible to assume that there is an MNE-speciﬁc, location-independent component ejt to the
selection shock ´n
j;t¡¿ and that the labor-demand shock ²`
jt correlates with the selection shock ´n
j;t¡¿
elsewhere only through the MNE-speciﬁc component ejt. The assumption is not rejected in our
data. Note that, under this assumption, cost function disturbances do covary with entry shocks













jt, where ! 2 [0;1] and the standard normal variables
ejt;u`
jt;vn
jt are independent of xm
jt and zj;t¡¿ for all `;m;n.
Any normally distributed random variable can be decomposed into an afﬁne function of standard
normal variables. Assumption 1 does this. Under Assumption 1, the variances and covariances of
the selection shocks are ¾``
´ = 1, as is common for probit, and ¾n`
´ = 1¡!. The variances and
covariances of the labor demand shocks are ¾``
² = ¸2 + (¼``
² )2 and ¾n`
² = ¸2. And the covariances
between the selection shock in location n and the demand shock in location ` are ¾n`
´² = ¸. So,
cost function disturbances do correlate with entry-relevant policy shocks across locations, but only
through an MNE-speciﬁc shock. The assumption accommodates potential serial correlation in





j;t¡&. Assumption 1 is testable. We obtain estimates of
¾n`
´ = 1¡! from multivariate probit estimation (on the same set of regressors as in Table 5) and
use a Â2-test for their equality. We fail to reject equality.
Intuitively, all selection-related information that is relevant for labor demand at any location `
is fully contained in the single presence indicator d`
jt, which is as informative about ´`
j;t¡¿ as any






if Assumption 1 holds.
46Proof. Denote the standard normal density and distribution functions with Á(¢) and ©(¢). Under










































² )2. This is the likelihood function for independent Heckman (1979) correction lo-









² is the coefﬁcient on
the selectivity hazard ¤`
jt(zj;t¡¿°`) (the inverse of the Mills ratio) in the outcome equation.






t =C, where °`
wn is the wage coefﬁcient in the selection equation, ¯`
¤ is the
coefﬁcient on the selectivity hazard in the outcome equation, and ¢`
jt is the ﬁrst derivative of the
selectivity hazard ¤`




j(zj;t¡¿°`) ¡ zj;t¡¿°`]. Because ¢`
j(¢) 2 (0;1), the sign of the log wage effect on
the wage bill at the extensive margin is the sign of the product °`
wn¯`
¤ (the coefﬁcients on the two
stages of estimation).
D Nonparametric selection correction
To establish identiﬁcation, consider the following deviations from the truth: ¢»`(x`
jt) ´ x`
jt(^ ¯` ¡
¯`) and ¢m`(Pjt) ´ ^ m`(Pjt) ¡ m`(Pjt), where hats denote estimates of the true (not hatted)
functions.




jt = 1;zj;t¡¿] = m`(Pjt) and Cov(²`
jt;´k
j;t¡¿) = 0 for k 6= `,
(ii) Pr(¢»`(x`
jt)+¢m`(Pjt)=0jd`
jt=1) = 1 implies that ¢»`(x`
jt) is constant,
(iii) rzj;t¡¿Pjt 6= 0 with probability one,
for ` = 1;:::;L.
47Part (i) posits that the conditional expectation of the labor demand disturbance at location ` is
a function of the propensity scores of presence at any location k = 1;:::;L. So, in the regres-
sion of observed labor demand y`
jt on x`
jt¯` and m`(Pjt), x`
jt¯` is a separate additive component.
This speciﬁcation applies nonparametric selectivity correction with a single outcome equation (but
multiple selection thresholds) in Das et al. (2003) to the multivariate outcome case.34 The general-
ization to simultaneous location selection (multivariate selectivity) comes at a price. To maintain
identifying restrictions similar to Das et al. (2003), we need to assume cross-equation indepen-
dence in the selection disturbance conditional on observable variables.
Part (ii) is the same identiﬁcation condition as in Das et al. (2003) and implies that Pjt (which
enters m`(Pjt)) depends on variables in zj;t¡¿ that are not in x`




jt) = m`(Pjt) and ¢m`(Pjt) = ¡m`(Pjt) indeterminate—a violation
of (ii). In our context, parent-ﬁrm characteristics and competitor-level host-country characteristics
are among the zj;t¡¿ predictors of presence but not related to the labor-speciﬁc part of the cost func-
tion other than through wages themselves. The rank condition (iii) requires that the information
set zj;t¡¿ predicts the propensity score.
Lemma 2 If Assumption 2 holds and if m`(Pjt) and Pjt(zj;t¡¿) are continuously differentiable
and have continuous distribution functions almost everywhere, then x`
jt¯` and m`(Pjt) are identi-
ﬁed up to additive constants.




jt^ ¯` + ^ m`(Pjt) for some x`
jt^ ¯` and ^ m`(Pjt). Equivalently,
deviations from the truth ¢»`(x`
jt) + ¢m`(Pjt) = 0. This identity must be differentiable with
respect to x`







`(Pjt)) ¢ rzj;t¡¿Pjt = 0:
The ﬁrst equation implies that ¢»`(x`
jt) = x`
jt(^ ¯` ¡ ¯`) = c1 for a constant c1 and x`
jt¯` is
34A semiparametric alternative would be the Lee (1995) estimator, a multivariate extension to Klein and Spady’s
(1993) semiparametric maximum-likelihood estimator. Lee (1995) partitions the covariates zj;t¡¿ to appear in
H(zj;t¡¿) through multiple indexes. Note, however, that in our context the information set zj;t¡¿ includes loca-
tion selection predictors from every world region; so there is no natural subpartition. A nonparametric estimator for
H(zj;t¡¿) accommodates the multiple-index case and simultaneous selection into more than one location.
48identiﬁed up to this constant. By rzj;t¡¿Pjt 6= 0, the second equation implies that ¢m`(Pjt) =
^ m`(Pjt) ¡ m`(Pjt) = c2 for a constant c2 and m`(Pjt) is identiﬁed up to that constant.
Under nonparametric location selection (Assumption 2) and polynomial series estimation, the
derivatives of m`(¢) and P `
jt at the extensive margin are the marginal effects on the polynomial
terms rPjtm`(Pjt) ¢ rwn
t¡¿Pjt ¢ w`
twn
t =C, which we evaluate at the sample mean.
E Data
E.1 Currency conversion and deﬂation
We deﬂate parent variables with the German consumer price index and deﬂate afﬁliate variables
with country-level consumer price indices (from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics).35
CPI series are available for a broader set of countries than producer or wholesale price series.
CPIs properly reﬂect the opportunity costs for investors who are the beneﬁciaries of ﬁrms’ proﬁt
maximization. We re-base CPI deﬂation factors to unity at year end 1998 and transform foreign
currency values to their EUR equivalents in December 1998 in order to remove nominal exchange
rate ﬂuctuations. December 1998 is the mid point in time for our 1996-2001 sample. Introduction
of the euro in early 1999 makes December 1998 a natural reference date.
In BuBa’s original MIDI data, all information on foreign afﬁliates is reported in German cur-
rency using the exchange rate at the closing date of the foreign afﬁliate’s balance sheet. Concretely,
we apply the following conversion to all ﬁnancial variables, including the physical capital stock
(ﬁxed assets). Deutschmark (DEM) ﬁgures are transformed into EUR at the rate 1/1.95583 (the
conversion rate at euro inception in 1999). (i) We use the market exchange rate on the end-of-
month day closest to an afﬁliate’s balance sheet closing date to convert the DEM or EUR ﬁgures
into local currency for every afﬁliate. This reverses the conversion applied to the questionnaires
at the date of reporting. (ii) A CPI factor for every country deﬂates the foreign-currency ﬁnancial
ﬁgures to the December-1998 real value in local currency. (iii) For each country, the average of
all end-of-month exchange rates vis-` a-vis the DEM or EUR between January 1996 and December
35We use the CPI in the currency-issuing country whenever a country’s CPI is not available from IFS but the main
currency is issued elsewhere. We use current exchange rates and the German price deﬂator whenever foreign price
deﬂators are missing or period-average exchange rate information is incomplete.
492001 is used as a proxy for purchasing power parity of foreign consumption baskets relative to the
DEM or EUR. All deﬂated local-currency ﬁgures are converted back to DEM or EUR using this
purchasing-power proxy.
E.2 Wages
Our main estimation sample uses sectoral manufacturing wages by country between 1996 and 2001
from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database at the 3-digit ISIC level, Rev. 2 (UNIDO 2005). The
UNIDO measure of annual sectoral wage bills includes all payments to workers at establishments
in the reference sector and year (wages and salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses
and gratuities, allowances, and payments in kind; but excludes contributions to social security,
pensions, insurance, severance and termination pay). We divide the sectoral wage bill by the
sectoral number of workers and employees. The UNIDO data cover 109 countries and result in the
largest overlap with MIDI observations.
For robustness checks, we use OWW monthly average wage rates of male workers at the country
level for 161 occupations in 155 countries between 1983 and 1999. Missing observations, however,
reduce the overlap with MIDI data below the overlap that UNIDO data provide. We follow Free-
man and Oostendorp’s (2001) recommendation and pick the base calibration with lexicographic
weighting for the aggregate wages by country. We ﬁll missing values, by country and occupation
group, with information from the latest preceding year that has wage information available and
reuse OWW wages from 1999 in 2000 and 2001. To mitigate workforce composition effects, we
take country medians over 161 OWW occupation groups for foreign wages. We multiply the result-
ing monthly median occupation wage by twelve to approximate annual earnings for cost function
estimation. Complementing foreign OWW wages, we use the German annual earnings survey (ta-
ble 62321 from destatis.de/genesis) and obtain sectoral monthly wages, broken down into three
blue-collar and four white-collar occupation groups by sector (two-digit NACE 1.1). We compute
median wages over these seven occupation groups by sector. Occupational wage information from
the German annual earnings survey enters the ILO database, on which OWW wages are based, so
that these foreign and domestic wages are compatible.
50E.3 Complementary data
National accounts information for host-country regressors comes from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. To condition selection
estimation on skill endowments beyond labor costs, we include the host country’s percentage of
highly educated residents in 1999 from Barro and Lee (2001) and interact the variable with an
indicator whether the percentage exceeds that in Germany (19.5%). We construct market access
measures following Redding and Venables (2004), using their measure MA(3). To capture relevant
cross-sectional variation, we compute competitor-level averages of the host-country characteristics
MNE by MNE. Many host-country regressors are nevertheless statistically insigniﬁcant predic-
tors in binary choice estimation, conditional on parent-level observable variables and host-country
wages.
F Alternative Estimators, Samples and Deﬁnitions
Table F.1 presents the relative difference between conventional estimates of cross-wage elastic-
ities at the intensive margin and selectivity-corrected estimates. The reported numbers are the
conventional estimate less the selectivity-corrected estimate, divided by the selectivity-corrected
estimate. Uncorrected cross-wage elasticities are frequently distorted towards complementarity
(negative relative differences), especially in the important ﬁrst row and ﬁrst column of the cross-
wage elasticity matrix, and signs are reversed into outright complementarity in several instances
(relative differences of less than negative one). Distortion into complementarity is observed espe-
cially often in the sample with afﬁliates from any sector (lower panel of Table F.1).
Our deﬁnition of aggregate locations is motivated by geographical proximity and broad insti-
tutional similarity (Table F.2). As a robustness check, we split the world into the home country
and four artiﬁcial regions deﬁned by the quartiles of UNIDO manufacturing wages in the initial
sample year 1996. Table F.3 reports estimated cross-wage elasticities for the wage-quartile groups
of countries, as discussed in Subsection 4.5.
51Table F.1: RELATIVE DIFFERENCE OF UNCORRECTED AND CORRECTED INTENSIVE-MARGIN
ESTIMATES
Wage change in
Relative difference in em- HOM CEE DEV OIN WEU
ployment effect estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign afﬁliates in manufacturing
HOM intensive -.081 .006 -.264 -.052 -.100
CEE intensive only -.081 -.043 -1.400 .083 -.148
DEV intensive only -.178 .102 -.065 .066 .075
OIN intensive only .013 -.010 .017 -.009 -.010
WEU intensive only -.121 .0007 .011 -.008 .117
Foreign afﬁliates in any sector
HOM intensive -.048 .015 .011 -.011 -.071
CEE intensive only -.095 -.060 -3.087 -.099 -.169
DEV intensive only -.019 -3.269 -.030 -4.244 -1.251
OIN intensive only -.009 .013 -4.352 -.017 -.043
WEU intensive only -.040 -.037 -1.268 -.013 -.039
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO wages), manufacturing MNEs and their majority-owned foreign
afﬁliates in manufacturing (upper panel) or in any sector (lower panel).
Notes: The relative difference between elasticities at the intensive margin from uncorrected ISUR estimation and
from parametric selectivity-corrected ISUR estimation (Assumption 1, Table 8) is the difference between the two
elasticity estimates divided by selectivity-corrected estimates. For afﬁliates in manufacturing, there are 2,141 stacked
MNE observations for uncorrected ISUR and 1,640 for selectivity-corrected ISUR estimation. For afﬁliates in any
sector, there are 3,183 stacked MNE observations for uncorrected ISUR and 2,501 for selectivity-corrected ISUR
estimation. Locations: HOM (Germany), CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), DEV (Developing countries), OIN
(Overseas Industrialized countries), WEU (Western Europe).
52Table F.2: AGGREGATE LOCATIONS
Locations Countries
WEU Western European countries
(EU 15 plus Norway and Switzerland)
OIN Overseas Industrialized countries
including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, USA
as well as Iceland and Greenland
CEE Central and Eastern European countries
including accession countries and candidates for EU membership
as well as Balkan countries, Belarus, Turkey, and Ukraine
DEV Developing countries
including Russia and Central Asian economies
as well as dominions of Western European countries and
of the USA
Table F.3: CROSS-WAGE ELASTICITIES BETWEEN WAGE QUARTILE GROUPS
Wage change (by 1%) in
Employment HOM Qrtl.4 Qrtl.3 Qrtl.2 Qrtl.1
change (%) in (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HOM intensive -.556¤¤¤ .509¤¤¤ .016 .029¤¤¤ -.006
Qrtl.4 intensive only 1.688¤¤¤ -1.746¤¤¤ .044 -.002 .008
extensive only .711¤¤¤ -.786¤¤¤ .048¤¤¤ .017¤¤¤ .002¤¤¤
Qrtl.3 intensive only .245 .198 -.384 -.090¤¤ .025
extensive only .711¤¤¤ .214¤¤¤ -.952¤¤¤ .017¤¤¤ .002¤¤¤
Qrtl.2 intensive only 1.175¤¤¤ -.018 -.248¤¤ -1.012¤¤¤ .097¤¤¤
extensive only .711¤¤¤ .214¤¤¤ .048¤¤¤ -.983¤¤¤ .002¤¤¤
Qrtl.1 intensive only -1.693 .694 .485 .696¤¤ -.188
extensive only .711¤¤¤ .214¤¤¤ .048¤¤¤ .017¤¤¤ -.998¤¤¤
Sources: MIDI and USTAN 1996 to 2001 (UNIDO wages).
Notes: Elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins from 677 stacked MNE observations. Underlying labor
demand estimates from parametric selectivity-corrected ISUR estimates (Assumption 1). Standard errors from 200
bootstraps: ¤¤ signiﬁcance at ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent. Locations: HOM (Germany) and four foreign-country groups by
manufacturing-wage quartiles, fourth quartile with top wages.
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